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Iowa Physicians:
Legitimacy, Institutions,
and the Practice of Medicine
Part Three
Dealing with Poverty
and Defending Autonomy, 1929-1950

IN JANUARY 1933 Dr. Oliver J. Fay, a general surgeon in Des
Moines who chaired the Iowa State Medical Society's Board of
Trustees, addressed the Polk County Medical Society with his
thoughts on the Final Report of tlze Committee on the Costs of Medical Care. That controversial report, the product of five years of
research by an amply funded interdisciplinary group, was
highly critical of medical care in America. Too many Americans
did not have access to physicians, the report asserted, and even
when they did, too many could not afford what they needed.
In Part 1 of this series, I expressed my gratitude to all of those who initiated
this project, provided research help, and offered helpful comments in its formative years. In Part 2, I thanked, with deep appreciation, the librarians, archivists and staff of the University of Iowa and the State Historical Society of
Iowa. In addition to all of those individuals, I am grateful to Jolm Fry for inviting me to the Newberry Library Seminar in Rural History, where I received
very helpful feedback on part of this article. Among the many people whose
conversations have stimulated rethinking, revisions, and rclwriting, I particularly thank Marilyn Olson and Angela Keysor.
THE ANNALS OF IOWA 66 (Winter 2007). 0The State Historical Society of
Iowa, 2007.

The recommendations of the majority, made up of economists,
lawyers, sociologists, public health experts, and physicians,
were hardly radical by twenty-first-century standards. The
committee contended that public health services needed to be
expanded to ensure safe water and milk supplies, proper community sanitation, and adequate control of communicable diseases. The majority members also maintained that medical services should be p;ovided by coordinated groups of physicians,
nurses, dentists, pharmacists, and assistants, rather than by independent, solo practitioners, in order to increase efficiency and
efficacy in the delivery of health care. The report urged, moreover, that "the costs of medical care be placed on a group payment basis," using pre-payment insurance premiums and tax
revenues, rather than centered on private, fee-for-service cash
transactions arranged individually between the physician and
the patient. With the support of public health services, "we can
have no quarrel," Dr. Fay admitted. The other recommendations
of the report he denounced. They spelled doom for American
medicine, for every physician's independence and individualism.
Dr. Fay concluded his essay with a ringing call for the physician's "right to carry on unshackled by bureaucratic control."l
By the early 1930s, the very success of the professional and
political changes that had taken place in the state since the 1850s
had put great strains on physicians' autonomy and individualism. As discussed in part one (1850-1886) of this three-part
study, in the first decades of statehood Iowans sought medical
1. Medical Care for the American People: The Final Report of the Committee on the
Costs of Medical Care (Chicago, 1932); Oliver J. Fay, "A Discussion of the Final
Report of the Committee on the Costs of Medical Care," Journal of the Iowa State
Medical Society (hereafter cited as JISMS) 23 (1933), 117,120,125. The full committee, which varied over the five years of the project, had more than 50 members. Several minority reports were included in the final publication, where
various constituencies dissented from some of the recommendations. Dr. Fay's
criticisms echoed those of seven of the private practice physicians on the committee, who, together with two other members, produced a strongly worded
minority report against group practice and any type of medical insurance.
There were 15 private practice physicians on the committee, however, so
seven of those doctors, along with eight other MDs in public health or institutional positions, agreed with the majority report. Paul Starr, The Social Transformation of American Medicine (New York, 1982), 261-66; Forrest A. Walker,
"Americanism versus Sovietism: A Study of the Reaction to the Committee on
the Costs of Medical Care," Bulletin of the History of Medicine 53 (1979),489-504.
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care from a diverse range of practitioners who competed with
each other for patients free from the "bureaucratic control" of
state licensing laws. Among the groups with differing therapeutic philosophies, only the regular, eclectic, and homeopathic
doctors had active leaders who launched medical schools, created medical societies, lobbied for public health measures, and
supported, for the most part, the building of state-funded institutions for the insane and other medical unfortunates. It took
until 1886 for doctors to put aside their disputes long enough to
push a medical practice act through the state legislature, giving
bureaucratic control of medical licensing to a state board of medical examiners.2 In those decades, at least some Iowa physicians
learned the power of collective action and political maneuvering in their efforts to establish legitimacy. Most practitioners,
nevertheless, had probably just gone about their business: seeing patients, dealing with illnesses and traumas, and trying to
make a decent living.
Between 1887 and 1928, the promises of scientific and technological innovations significantly changed the practice of medicine. Part two (1887-1928) covered the way Iowa's licensing law
gave the State Board of Medical Examiners the power to reshape
medical education, leaving the state with only one regular medical school, at the University of Iowa, in 1913. Bacteriology became the poster child for the value of laboratory science to
understand and, in some cases, to actually prevent and treat
life-threatening infectious diseases. The discovery and spread of
x-ray imaging in medicine similarly epitomized the technological wonders of medicine made modern. The number of hospitals across the state grew dramatically, from 21 in 1890 to 175 in
1930, as the preferred places for surgica1,operations shifted from
homes to operating theaters. Physicians became increasingly
dependent on access to laboratory tests, x-ray machines, and
hospital facilities when caring for their patients, and increasingly felt pressured to keep up with the deluge of information
coming out of research laboratories and from the pens of prominent practitioners. The staunchly individualistic country doctor
2. Susan C. Lawrence, "Iowa Physicians: Legitimacy, Institutions, and the Practice of Medicine," Part 1, "Establishing a Professional Identity," Annals of Iowa
62 (2003), 151-200.

who relied only on his own experience with time-tested remedies was no longer a quaint eccentric, no matter how beloved;
he started to be dangerously old-fashioned. Members of the
Iowa State Medical Society (ISMS) worked hard to encourage
all Iowa physicians to attend meetings of their county medical
societies, sign up for postgraduate courses, read medical journals, and adapt to the collective wisdom of experts and specialists - a push that continued from 1928 to 1950. On the political side, state legislators in Iowa generally supported the growth
of hospitals and the development of public health efforts in
those decades, but they by no means slavishly followed mainstream medicine's wish list. Licensing acts for osteopathic physicians (1902) and chiropractic healers (1921), for instance, upset
ISMS members, who discovered that their claims to scientific
authority in medical matters did not persuade Iowans to renounce alternative practices.3
This article, the last of this three-part series, briefly lays out
some of the major changes in medical organization and institutions in Iowa between 1929 and 1950. The bulk of the essay then
focuses on the effects that the rising costs of medical care had on
ordinary Iowa physicians. Anxiety about the expense of medical services for the respectable working and middle classes
joined worries about paying for the basic health needs of the
indigent and marginally poor. In the 1910s and 1920s, more
physicians and more patients expected hospital stays for surgery and childbirth, looked to laboratory-based tests for diagnostic information, and required office visits for vaccinations,
health checkups, and ongoing monitoring of treatments, and all
of these cost money. These changing standards of medical care
had already started to reshape the meaning of access to adequate medical practice, especially in rural areas and among
lower income groups, by the late 1920s.4 The disjunction between what scientifically trained physicians could provide and
what people perceived they could afford, along with the widen--

-

3. Susan C. Lawrence, "Iowa Physicians: Legitimacy, Institutions, and the Practice of Medicine," Part 2, "Putting Science into Practice," Annals of Iowa 62
(2004), 1-62.
4. Clive A. Henry, "Green Fields of the Country Practitioner," JISMS 19 (1929),
95-102.
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ing gap between professional knowledge and common lay understanding of health and disease, led to a widespread crisis of
confidence in the traditional fee-for-service, individualistic system of private medical practice. The worsening of the Iowa
economy in the late 1920s and the national depression throughout the 1930s turned the problem of medical care for the poor
and for those on the margins of solvency into a major issue for
Iowa doctors.
Until the early 1930s, dealing with the poor in America was
almost entirely a local responsibility: local governments (counties, towns, and cities) and charities (lay and religious) provided
the food, clothing, shelter, medicines, and therapies that kept
most of those in dire straits from dying in the streets. With the
onset of the Great Depression, the local, customary, and ad hoc
ways of dealing with medical neediness stopped working. Infusions of federal and state funds into local governments after
1934 brought much needed help, yet also brought state-level
expectations for the oversight and accountability of money
spent on health care. Iowa's economy recovered during World
War 11, as did the nation's, but debates about health care costs
and services became even more heated. In the years imrnediately following the war, many Americans hoped that private,
employer-based health insurance would expand to fill citizens'
needs for protection against the costs of catastrophic, povertyinducing illnesses and traumas. In Iowa, as in other states, physicians who objected to commercial insurance companies taking
on health care coverage reluctantly agreed to form a non-profit,
physician-controlled plan organized at the state level. The Iowa
State Medical Society essentially created the Iowa Medical Service (Blue Shield) in 1945-46. Iowa physicians pushed the Iowa
Medical Service plan as a viable, and better, alternative to a federally funded, universal-coverage national health insurance
program when arguing against various bills that went to Congress in the late 1940s. Responsibility for medical care for the
poor largely returned to county governments, with some state
oversight and state-funded programs, until the 1960s.
Quite a few historians have written on twentieth-century
American health care politics and policies from a national, and

predominately urban, viewpoint.5 Their work certainly informs
this study of the history of medicine in Iowa. I argue, however,
that examining health care politics at the state and county level,
particularly in a rural, agricultural state such as Iowa, offers a
vital perspective on the dynamics of national politics, because
so many of the day-to-day experiences that physicians had with
"government" medicine first took place at the county level.6
Physicians had to deal with those in need in their own comrnunities at the same time that they competed with each other for
paying patients. Appreciating how physicians throughout Iowa
discussed medical politics and reacted to payment plans run by
non-physicians helps us to understand how and why organized
medicine -seen so clearly at the national level of the American
Medical Association (AMA)-became such a powerful economic
and political force in American society in the 1930s and 1940s.
Concentrating on "organized medicine" -medicine seen
through institutional data, meeting reports, and items printed
in the Journal of the Iowa State Medical Society- obviously misses
a great deal.7 Much more work is needed on the ways people
experienced health needs in Iowa, interacted with physicians,
used hospitals, and expected -or not -that new scientific and
5. Among the most important works on the complexities of medical politics
and economics in American history are Stan; Social Transformation; Colin Gordon, Dead on Arrival: The Politics of Health Care in Twentieth-Century America
(Princeton, NJ, 2003); Beatrix Hoffman, The Wages of Sickness: The Politics of
Health Insurance in Progressive America (Chapel Hill, NC, 2001); and Ronald
Numbers, Almost Persuaded: American Physicians and Compulsory Health Insurance, 1912-1920 (Baltimore, 1978).
6. Michael R. Grey makes the same argument in his excellent study, N m Deal
Medicine: The Rural Health Programs of the Farm Security Administration (Baltimore, 1999).Grey focuses particularly on states with large FSA programs, especially North Dakota and South Dakota.
7. In addition to the lacunae mentioned in the text, note that several social
movements that involved physicians and medical care in Iowa have been
omitted from this discussion. Among these, one of the most important is the
eugenics movement in Iowa. See Amy Vogel, "Regulating Degeneracy: Eugenic Sterilization in Iowa, 1911-1977," Annals of Iowa 54 (1995), 121-43. For
discussions of eugenics in the JISMS, see "Legalized Eugenic Sterilization,"
JISMS 25 (1935), 155; "Report of Special Committee on Eugenics," JISMS 11
(1921), 278; "Sterilization of the Unfit," JISMS 19 (1929), 127-28; Eleanor
Hutchinson, "Possibilities for Race Betterment," ]ISMS 24 (1934), 577-80; Willard C. Brinegar et al., "Sterilization of Patients Discharged from Four Iowa
State Hospitals in 1947," JISMS 40 (1950),263-64.
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medical discoveries would make a difference in their lives and
deaths. National studies on "average" health care costs in the
1930s and 1940s may provide interesting figures, but such data
are useless for understanding the choices that rural and urban
Iowans made about health care. Alternative, unlicensed healers
did not disappear just because Iowa had medical practice acts.
Drugstores carried scores of over-the-counter remedies that offered relief without the bother of seeing a doctor, and Iowa saw
its share of entrepreneurs promising dubious cures.8 The sources
used for this article amply document Iowa physicians' complaints about these treatment options, but doctors' p m b l i n g s
give poor estimates of the extent and seriousness of Iowans'
engagement with self-help and irregular practitioners in these
decades. Similarly, passing notices and references suggest that
public health campaigns to spread information about contagious
diseases, to inform people about the importance of early detection of cancer, and to get schoolchildren in for health checkups
all depended on armies of volunteers and community organizations; their local efforts deserve further analysis.9 Articles in the
8. Eric S. Juhnke, Quacks and Crusaders: The Fabulous Careers of John Brinkley,
Norman Baker and Harry Hoxsey (Lawrence, KS, 2002), 36-63, details Norman
Baker's claims to cure cancer at his hospital in Muscatine in the early 1930s;
James C. Whorton, Nature Cures: The Histoy of Alternative Medicine in America
(New York, 2002), provides a useful overview of alternative healing movements. For the popularity of over-the-counter dietary supplements following
the discoveries of vitamins, see Rima D. Apple, Vitamania: Vitamins in American Culture (New Brunswick, NJ, 1996).
9. Laura Gellott, "Visiting the Rural Community: A Public Health Education
Program in the 1930s," Mid-America: A Historical Xmiew 69 (1987), 21-38; Mrs.
Fred Moore, "The Women's Auxiliary to the Iowa State Medical Society," in
One Hundred Years of Iowa Medicine: Commemorating the Centenary of the Iowa
State Medical Society, 1850-1950 (Iowa City, 1950), 427-29. The women's auxiliary had a regular news page in the JISMS after 1936. Most historical work on
women's clubs to date focuses on the years before 1930 and deals largely with
education, libraries, or political activism rather than local health concerns. See,
for example, Anne Firor Scott, Natural Allies: Women's Associations in American
History (Urbana, 1991).Gerald Gamm and Robert D. Putnam, "The Growth of
Voluntary Associations in America, 1840-1940," Journal of Interdisciplinary Hist o y 29 (1999), 511-57, point out that voluntary associations after 1910 were
particularly strong in "the hinterland (514) rather than in large, urban areas,
where voluntarism actually declined. A few national-level histories of voluntary health organizations have been written, and they could provide useful
starting points for further research on local efforts. See, for example, Walter S.
Ross, Crusade: The Oficial History of the American Cancer Society (New York, 1987).

ISMS Journal show, moreover, that new research results, drugs,
and procedures entered medical practice in the state, but it is
impossible to know from these texts how many Iowa physicians
actually studied these innovations and incorporated them successfully into their own work.10
Focusing on the professional preoccupations of members of
the Iowa State Medical Society also requires acknowledging
that the vast majority of them were white and male. The editors
of the ISMS Journal occasionally noted when an African American doctor settled in Iowa, and in 1933 its "Interesting News"
column noted that only eight African American physicians
practiced in a state with 17,380 African Americans.11 The health
needs of African Americans, Native Americans, and other rninorities generated no major articles or editorials, confirming the
sense that those populations largely stayed below mainstream
medicine's sightlines during the Depression and war years.
Women's names appear as authors of articles in the ISMS Jouunal, but women never seem to turn up serving as county delegates to the business meetings of the society or participating in
delegate discussions. Members were sometimes identified only
by initials, so a few women may have played such roles, but
certainly no woman was elected as an executive officer during
these decades. Until 1942, some women physicians did gather
each year for a day-long meeting of the "State Society of Iowa
10. For examples of reports of new drugs and therapies, see Elmer Kottke, "Nonspecific Immunotransfusions in the Treatment of Hemolytic Streptococcus
Septicemia," JISMS 24 (1934), 431-36 (on serum therapy); Frank G. Norbury,
"The Use of Barbital Products," JISMS 26 (1936), 338-43 (on barbituates, such
as phenobarbital, sodium amytal, and nembutal); Arthur C. Christie, "Present
Conception of Radiation in the Treatment of Cancer," JISMS 27 (1937),1-9; R. B.
Gibson, "Fluids for Intravenous and Subcutaneous Use," JISMS 29 (1939), 1920; Elmer L. DeGowin, "Blood Transfusion Reactions," JISMS 29 (1939), 20-21;
Ralph L. Gorrell, "The Uses of Benzedrine Sulfate in General Practice," JISMS
29 (1939),451-53 (on amphetamines);James Green, "The Clinical Use of Adrenal
Cortical Hormone," JISMS 30 (1940), 287-91; Capt. Harold Schwartz, "Analysis of the Rh Factor," JISMS 33 (1943), 217-19; and Diedrich J. Haines, "The
Anticoagulant Drugs," ]ISMS 37 (1947), 446-49 (on coumadin and heparin).
11. "Personal Mention," JISMS 23 (1933), 173; "Interesting News," JISMS 23
(1933), 688. For an important survey of African American physicians in Iowa,
see Steven Berry and Erin Herndon, "Healing Hands, Questing Hearts: African-American Physicians in Iowa," in Bill Silag et al., eds., Outside In: AficanAmerican History in Iowa, 1838-2000 (Des Moines, 2001), 243-69.
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Medical Women," which held sessions on the day before the
start of the ISMS regular annual conference. Between 1942 and
1950, however, the women had "no scientific programs" at their
gatherings over lunch or dinner.12 The absence of African Arnerican and women physicians in this article thus directly reflects
their relative absence from professional power in the 1930s and
1940s, but not their absence from the practice of medicine.

Access to Care: Physicians, Hospitals, and Public Health
By 1928, the movement of physicians from rural areas to towns
and cities was well under way. Telephones, automobiles, paved
roads, hospitals, and the amenities of town life all played a part
in this internal migration. Various experts debated the relationships among the number of doctors, their geographic distribution,
and the adequacies of medical care for Americans, but Iowans
certainly noticed that young physicians were not replacing
small-town practitioners who moved or retired in the 1930s and
1940s.13 The 1940 federal census revealed, for example, that 67
percent of Iowa's physicians lived in urban areas, while only
43 percent of the state's population did.14 Less remarked upon
in the state medical journal, but certainly noticeable in public
data, were overall declines in the numbers of both physicians
and hospitals between 1931 and 1950. There were 3,125 physicians practicing in Iowa in 1931 but only 2,890 in 1950. As the
state's population increased in those decades, the ratio of physician to residents dropped from one per 790 in 1930 to one per
907 in 1950 (see table 1).There was a perceptible drop in the
number of general practitioners, as well, from 2,718 (87 percent)
to 2,201 (76 percent), as more doctors chose to limit their work
to a specialty. Similarly, the number of Iowa's 99 counties that
had a hospital fell from 75 in 1931 to 68 in 1950; the total num12. Jeannette Dean Throckmorton, "State Society of Iowa Medical Women," in
One Hundred Years of Medicine in Iowa, 425-26.
13. "The Rural Physician," JISMS 26 (1936), 106; "Rural Medical Supply,"
JISMS 37 (1947),213-14.
14. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Bulletin. Population. Third Series. The Labor Force
(Washington, DC, 1942), Table 10. In 1940 the Bureau of the Census defined
"urban" as towns of more than 2,500 people.

TABLE 1
SPECIALTY
PRACTICE IN IOWA,
1931AND 1950
Total number of physicians in Iowa
Number limiting practice to a specialty
Specialistswith national board certification
General practitioners

1931
3,125
407 (13%)
31*
2,718 (87%)

1950
2,890
689 (24%)
279**
2,201 (76%)

SOURCE:The American Medical Directory, 1931and 1950.
*In 1931 only three specialties had national boards: Ophthalmology (1917), Otolaryngology (1924), and Obstetrics and Gynecology (1930).
**In1950, sixteen specialties had national boards: Ophthalmology (1917); Otolaryngology
(1924); Obstetrics and Gynecology (1930); Dermatology (1932); Pediatrics (1933); Orthopedic Surgery (1934); Psychiatry and Neurology (1934); Radiology (1934); Urology (1935);
Internal Medicine (1936);Pathology (1936);Anesthesiology (1937); Plastic Surgery (1937);
Surgery (1937);Neurological Surgery (1940); Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation (1947).

ber of institutions fell from 175 to 133 across the state (see table
2). These were hardly dramatic changes, but they nevertheless
suggest that some Iowans had reasons to believe that access to
basic medical care had gotten worse, not better, in those years.15
A few bare numbers tell only part of the story, of course,
and can have multiple interpretations. From the perspective of
the profession's leaders, the decline in the number of doctors
was a necessary corrective to the oversupply of poorly trained
physicians pumped out of proprietary medical schools in the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The drop in the
number of hospitals in Iowa occurred because quite a few very
small, privately owned hospitals closed in these decades. Some
hospitals merged with others, especially in larger towns and
cities, and yet other institutions added buildings and wings, so
that there were actually more hospital beds in Iowa in 1950 than
in 1931, even if they were farther away from small rural communities.16 Professional leaders thus also saw the end of small
hospitals that, in some cases, were no more than boardinghouses
with nursing care and a physician close by, as a sign of progress.
15. T. A. Moran, "Are Prospective Medical Students Getting a Square Deal?"
JISMS 27 (1937), 500-501.
16. Iowa followed national trends in hospital closings and distribution. See
Rosemary Stevens, In Sickness and In Wealth:American Hospitals in the Twentieth
Centuy (New York, 1989), 121-22147-49.
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TABLE 2
HOSPITALS
IN IOWA, 1931AND 1950
Primary funding and affiliation
Reli~ousand charitable: Total
Catholic
Protestant
Charity/Non-profit Associations
Fraternal

-

Private individual or partnership businesses: Total
Private - physician owned
Private - other groups and unknown
Railroad consortium
Tax-based institutions: Total
Federal - Military and Veterans
State - Mental disorders
State - General
State - Tuberculosis
County - Mental disorders
County - General
County - Tuberculosis
County - Isolation
Municival - General
Municipal - Isolation
Total

1931 1950
65
72

75
54
20
1

30
22
7
1

3
175

133

SOURCES:Clyde A. Boice, "Hospitals in Iowa," in One Hundred Years of Medicine in lowa,

371-419; American Medical Directory, vol. 12 (1931); "Hospitals Registered by the American Medical Association,"JIAMA 146 (1951),139-40. The 1950 data include the Atchison,
Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Employees Hospital in Fort Madison, as physicians listed
it as their place of work in the American Medical Directory, 1950.

The American College of Surgeons (ACS), a national group
heavily invested in improving the quality of hospital facilities for
surgical work in these decades, had started reviewing and certifying hospitals that met their minimum standards for staffing,
equipment, and services in 1918.17 Only 34 Iowa hospitals met
their standards in 1931. The number went up to 46 by 1950, but
that was still only 35 percent of the state's institutions.
17. Stevens, In Sickness and In Wealth, 68-70, 116-20. Samuel Levey et al., The
Rise of a University Teaching Hospital: A Leadership Perspective, The University
of lowa Hospitals and Clinics (Chicago, 1996), 94-97, covers the introduction of
ACS standards and the UI hospital's compliance; for residencies, see 181-83.

The shift toward fewer but better physicians and fewer but
better hospitals played out well for the residents of Iowa's larger
cities. The resulting geographical inequities, along with continuing debates over what access to health care really meant, nevertheless heightened the perception that rural populations were
increasingly underserved. In the postwar years, Iowa legislators
generally supported the push for federal funding to build hospitals and health centers for rural areas.18 Finding solutions for
the unequal distribution of physicians, especially with the decline in the number of general practitioners, was far more contentious, and it has remained an ongoing political and economic
issue.19
To the concern about the number and distribution of physicians, adequate hospitals, and rural versus urban practice must
be added frictions between academic medicine- the medicine
of research institutes, university medical schools, large teaching
hospitals, and prestigious specialty boards -and the medicine
of full-time community practitioners. Gown-and-town tensions
were certainly not new to medicine in Iowa, but some became
particularly sharp during the Depression and war, and played a
role in medical politics throughout the state.
After 1913, the University of Iowa (UI) College of Medicine
was the only regular medical school in Iowa, and Iowa's physicians were repeatedly urged to support and admire "their" college of medicine and the university's hospitals. That was not
always easy when it seemed that the UI's need for resources
conflicted with small-town practitioners' needs for payments
and patients. The Perkins Act (1915) and the Haskell-Klaus Act
(1919) funded a steady stream of indigent children and adults to
the UI hospitals, where their numbers allowed for major expan18. "Rural Health Program in Iowa," JISMS 36 (1946), 527-28; "Hospital Construction in Iowa," JISMS 36 (1946), 494-95; "Hospital Survey and Construction Program," JISMS 39 (1949), 22-23. On the shortage of nurses and technicians for new hospitals, see "What Will the Hospital Building Program Entail?" JISMS 40 (1950), 187.
19. Lee Anderson, Internal Medicine and the Structures of Modem Medical Science:
The University of Iowa, 1870-1990 (Ames, 1996), 134-38; "National Conference
on Medical Service," JISMS 37 (1947,134; Arthur D. Woods, "General Practice
and Licensure," JISMS 40 (1950), 199-204.
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sion into the new Children's Hospital (1919) and General Hospital (1928). Those patients provided the population base for
teaching cases, without which the medical school could not survive. Care of the indigent -and the distribution of the tax funds
that supported that care-was a major source of envy and hard
feelings in the 1930s and 1940s. On the other hand, the state's academic medical center administrators and faculty felt considerable
frustration over budget cuts, calls to end or m o d e indigent care
funding to the UI, and complaints from Iowa physicians that UI
doctors competed unfairly with non-U1 practitioners for private
(paying) patients.20
Much of the sense of unfair competition came from the obvious associations between the UI's medical school, its taxsupported teaching hospital, and the rise of specialty practice.
Across the United States, specialization throve in medical
schools and teaching hospitals, and the UI was no exception. In
1928 the UI had 13 clinical departments, each with specialists as
faculty. Together with faculty in the basic science departments,
specialists parceled out lecture, laboratory, and clinical time in
the four-year medical curriculum to piece together the education of the all-purpose doctor who, after one year of hospital
experience as an intern, could jump into general practice.21
Many medical students did enter general practice, but the allure
of specialization intensified in the 1930s and 1940s. Specialists
topped the hierarchy in science-based medical knowledge,
clinical expertise, and professional prestige, as students could
not help but notice as they made hospital rounds. They also
made a great deal more money than general practitioners. In
1931, for example, readers of the ISMS Journal learned that specialists in the United States averaged an income of $16,000 per

20. W. W. Bowen, "The Present Status of Medicine," JISMS 24 (1934), 146. Lee
Anderson's Internal Medicine provides a nuanced account of this troubled period from the UI College of Medicine's perspective; see especially 59-64, 80,
103-7. The UI hospitals' standpoint is equally well explained in Levey et al.,
University Teaching Hospital, especially 147-58,188-95.
21. E. M. MacEwen, "Medicine and Medical Education in the Postwar Era,"
JISMS 35 (1945), 356-57; Kenneth M. Ludmerer, Time to Heal: American Medical
Education from the Turn of the Century to the Era of Managed Care (New York,
1999),66-70.

year, compared with an average of $2,000 to $5,000 for "well
established [general]physicians in small communities."22
General practitioners could develop specialty interests by
joining specialist medical societies, taking short courses in specialty areas, and announcing their shifts in practice to their colleagues and patients until they could restrict their work entirely
to one field. As early as the late 1910s, however, national societies and organizations of specialists became increasingly concerned that any licensed physician could claim to be a specialist
and limit his or her practice to a particular area of medicine,
such as ophthalmology, obstetrics, or neurosurgery, without
having to demonstrate appropriate knowledge and skills to her
or his practicing peers. Instead of turning to state legislators for
legal restrictions on what a self-proclaimed specialist could or
could not do without an additional layer of licensing, specialists
pushed for public recognition of voluntary certification of competence by professional boards, who represented national, not
state or local, interests. From the American Board of Ophthalmology (1917) to the American Board of Physical Medicine and
Rehabilitation (1947), representatives from a wide range of specialty societies met to establish the ground rules for their particular areas of expertise. As these national boards launched
themselves, they all began with ways for existing practitioners
to quallfy for board certification through reputations achieved
by publications, faculty positions, specialist society memberships, and the documentation of patients actually treated. For
younger practitioners, and for future ones, each board set up
expectations for years of clinical experience in the specialty and
required applicants to pass national examinations of knowledge
and skills. As the best way to gain appropriate clinical experience efficiently was through periods of hospital training beyond
the internship year, specialty residency positions in hospitals
became the standard route to specialty practice and, if desired,
board certification.23
Of course, not just any hospital would do for residency education. In 1920 the AMA's Council on Medical Education and
22. "Interesting News," ]ISMS 21 (1931), 95.
23. Ludmerer, Time to Heal, 80-101; Starr, Social Transformation,223-25,356-57.
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Hospitals started to identify hospitals that had the facilities and
staff necessary to offer internship training, and the council extended its purview to approve hospitals for residency positions
in 1924. The number of hospitals in Iowa that could offer the internship experience required for medical licensing stood at ten
in 1931, 1940, and 1950, all-except for the hospitals in Iowa
City- in cities with more than 40,000 residents: Cedar Rapids,
Council Bluffs, Davenport, Des Moines, and Sioux City. Even
more was expected for hospitals to quallfy for residency positions, because such training created the profession's elite. In
Iowa in 1931 only two hospitals had residencies: UI's general
hospital and the U1 Psychopathic Hospital, which provided
specialty training in psychiatry. To these, by 1940, were added
Oakdale Sanatorium for specialists in lung diseases and St.
Luke's Methodist Hospital in Cedar Rapids. By 1950, the total
number had increased to ten hospitals, including several general
hospitals in Des Moines and, for psychiatric specialization, the
Cherokee State Hospital for Mental Diseases in Cherokee.24 Five
hospitals had both internship and residency approval in 1950.
The distribution of hospitals approved for internships and
residencies reflected the distribution of Iowa physicians who
not only claimed specialty practice, but also achieved board certification. For the state as a whole, 279 (40 percent) of the 689
specialists had passed national board requirements by 1950 (see
table 1). At the UI Hospital, 90 percent of the 61 faculty who
were specialists in areas with national boards had qualified for
them. In Des Moines, the largest urban area in Iowa (and ten
times the size of Iowa City), 51 percent of the 118 who limited
their practices to a specialty with a national board had a board
certification. In contrast, of the five small cities in Iowa with
populations between 10,000 and 15,000, only 18 of the 91 physicians (20 percent) restricted their work to a board-recognized
specialty, and just five of them (28 percent) had sought board
certification by 1950.25
--

--

-

-

24. Entries for hospitals in Iowa in the American Medical Directory, 1930 and
1939; "Hospitals Registered by the American Medical Association," Journal of
the American Medical Association (hereafter cited as JAMA)146 (1951), 139-40.
25. American Medical Directory, 1950. The five small cities were Ames, Boone,
Fort Madison, Newton, and Oskaloosa. Only the last three had general hospi-

The UI Hospital clearly did not have a monopoly on specialists, even board-certified specialists, but it did have the high
ground when it came to expecting that clinicians would obtain
the official approbation of national peers when claiming expertise in specialty areas. The fear that UI specialists would-and
did -draw well-to-do private patients from across the state,
away from perfectly fine practitioners in other cities and towns,
led to an understanding reached in 1928 that no more than 5
percent of the beds in the UI hospitals could be used for paying
patients. This minimum was regularly overlooked, however,
which fueled Iowa physicians' anxieties in these decades, especially when a few outspoken UI clinicians roundly criticized
any restriction on their private practices. Whether the UI faculty
could realistically have threatened many physicians' livelihoods
matters less than the way that the UI stood for all of the changes
affecting medicine: larger and larger hospitals with fancy diagnostic laboratories, the newest in expensive, advanced devices
(such as the first respirator and electrocardiograph), increasing
expertise in highly technical research science, and the fragmentation of the patient into dehumanized parts.26
Private practice physicians across the state also dealt with
the mixed blessings of state-funded public health programs,
regulations, and initiatives in the decades from 1928 to 1950.
On the one hand, public health work to improve sanitation,
gather vital statistics, monitor outbreaks of infectious diseases,
promote vaccinations, and educate Iowans about personal hygiene all had visible results, despite the privations of the Depression and war. Maternal and infant mortality declined
substantially during these years (see fig. 1).By 1946-47, Iowa
tals, although there was an infirmary at Iowa State University for students that
may have been available in emergencies to other Ames residents. Medical
sociologists have studied the distribution of physicians in considerable depth,
using sophisticated statistical methods. See, for example, David L. Brown,
"The Redistribution of Physicians and Dentists in Incorporated Places of the
Upper Midwest, 1950-1970," Rural Sociology 39 (1974), 205-23.
26. Anderson, Internal Medicine, 104-6; Levey et al., University Teaching Hospital, 188, 192-95, 234-39; "Report of Committee on Medical Education and
Hospitals," JISMS 40 (1950), 342-44; "The Family Doctor and the Specialist,"
]ISMS 21 (19311, 189; "A New Therapeutic Problem," JISMS 29 (1939), 462;
"The Role of the General Practitioner," 37 JISMS (1947), 171-72.
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FIGURE 1

DEATH
RATES IN IOWA,1925-1950:
TOTALDEATHS,
INFANT DEATHS,
AND MATERNAL
DEATHS

tTotal

deaths per 1 0 0 0 population

tMaternal

4 Infant

deaths per 1 0 0 0 llve births

deaths per 10.000 llve blrths

SOURCE:Division of Records and Statistics, Iowa State Department
of Health, Vital Statistics of Iowa (Des Moines, 1977), Table 3.

boasted the lowest death rate from tuberculosis in the nation:
11.8 per 100,000 people, compared with the national rate of 33.5
per 100,000.27 These successes came primarily from traditional
public health techniques that focused on identifying individuals
with diseases, urging those who needed professional care to
seek it, and imposing quarantines or isolation on actively contagious citizens.28 Antibiotics, notably streptomycin (developed
in 1944-1946), effective against tuberculosis, and penicillin (from
laboratory work to mass production between 1938 and 1943),
27. "Iowa Leads in Tuberculosis Program," JISMS 36 (1946), 298-99; "Tuberculosis Death Rate per 100,000 Population among Residents of Each State,"
JISMS 39 (1949), 216. For a comparison with earlier data, see "Tuberculosis
Morbidity and Mortality in Iowa," JISMS 25 (1935), 617-18.
28. For an overview of public health developments in the United States in
these decades, see John Duffy, The Sanitarians: A Histoy of American Public
Health (Chicago, 1990), 256-72. For discussions of the demographic transition
from deaths due to infectious diseases to deaths from chronic conditions such
as heart disease and cancer, see the still classic Thomas McKeown, The Modern
Rise of Population (New York, 1976); and James C. Riley, Rising Life Expectancy:
A Global Histoy (Cambridge, 2001).

the wonder-drug for a range of infections that affected maternal
and infant morbidity, did not have a sigruficant impact until
they reached mass distribution and physicians learned how and
when to administer them.29
Iowans were a bit more reluctant to embrace vaccination
against smallpox, however, which led Walter Bierring, the State
Commissioner of Health from 1933 through 1953, to observe in
1942 that Iowa had an "undesirable reputation of being one of
the hotbeds of smallpox infestation in the nation."30 Physicians
were required to immediately report cases of major infectious
Diseases to the State Department of Health so that nascent epidemics could be contained, and Dr. Bierring issued monthly
reports and warnings, published in the ISMS Journal, listing
numbers of cases and, except for syphilis and gonorrhea, the
counties where cases appeared.31 Both physicians and public
health workers knew well, however, that doctors were not always called even for serious diseases, such as smallpox, measles,
and diphtheria, which allowed them to spread and, of course,
skewed the numbers that Dr. Bierring's department so carefully
29. John E. Lesch, "The Discovery of M & B 693 (Sulfapyridine)," in The Inside
S t o y of Medicines: A Symposium, ed. Gregory J. Higby and Elaine C. Stroud
(Madison, WI, 1999, 101-19; "Let's Be Getting Ready for Penicillin," JISMS 33
(1943), 475-76; J. Donald Anderson and Lee Forrest Hill, "Penicillin in the
Treatment of Severe Staphylococcic Bacteriemia with Complications: Report of
a Case," JISMS 34 (1944), 191-98; Karl H. Pfuetze and Marjorie M. Pyle, "Uses
and Limitations of Streptomycin in Tuberculosis," JISMS 38 (1948), 467-71.
Harry F. Dowling, Fighting Infection: Conquests of the Twentieth Centuy (Cambridge, M A , 1977), 126-32179-82 discusses the discovery of antibiotics, and,
on pp. 48-49 and 106-16, earlier treatment of infections, especially the use of
serum treatments and sulfonarnides.
30. "Fourth Annual Immunization Campaign," JISMS 32 (1942), 462; "1948 Our
First Year Without Smallpox," JISMS 39 (1949), 72. Resistance to vaccination
for smallpox in the late 1930s and 1940s in Iowa, and elsewhere in the Midwest, requires more research. Existing historical accounts suggest that the antivaccination movement had more or less disintegrated by the 1930s, but this
seems to underplay continuing localized fears of the procedure. See Martin
Kaufman, "The American Anti-Vaccinationists and their Arguments," Bulletin
of the Histoy of Medicine 41 (1969,463-78.
31. For mandatory reporting laws, state authority to require quarantines, placarding, and, if necessary, forcible removal to isolation wards or hospitals for
those seen as a danger to public health, see 1931 Code oflowa, ch. 108. For an
overview of the centralization of public health administration to 1933, see N. W.
McGee, "State Administration of Public Health in Iowa," Iowa Journal of History
and Politics 31 (1933),163-210.
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tabulated each monh32 Public health surveillance and notifications also alerted Iowa's physicians to diseases that had been
under-appreciated or even barely recognized as health threats
at the start of the twentieth century, such as poliomyelitis and
undulant fever (later renamed brucellosis).33 Even before combat in the Pacific brought U.S. soldiers back home to Iowa with
worrisome -and infectious -tropical diseases, moreover, Dr.
Bierring alerted the state's doctors to a rise in reported cases of
malaria, a debilitating and sometimes fatal disease carried by
anopheline mosquitoes.34 The persistence of smallpox, outbreaks of polio, and a potential postwar resurgence in malaria
reminded Iowans not to become complacent just because typhoid, diphtheria and tuberculosis seemed to be on the wane.
On the other hand, physicians remained concerned that public health initiatives, especially when championed by lay groups,
would trespass upon the individual, fee-for-service practice of
medicine. Dr. R. G. Leland of Chicago assured members of the
ISMS in 1934 that "you do not here have the same fears, the same
encroachments of health department activities on the practice
of medicine, that exists in some other states," and he praised
Dr. Bierring's intent to keep proper boundaries around public
health measures. Major efforts to improve children's health by
organizing annual "round-ups" of schoolchildren for medical
checkups, for example, required careful negotiations among the
staff of the Bureau of Maternity and Child Hygiene (part of the
32. See, for example, "The Lost Sheep," JISMS 25 (1935), 98-99.
33. Wade H. Frost, "The Epidemiology of Poliomyelitis," JISMS 19 (1929), 22328; "The Death Rate in Iowa Increases," JISMS 21 (1931), 520; "Sulfanilamide
and Sulfapyridine in Polio," JISMS 29 (1939), 462-63; "Unprecedented Incidence of Poliomyelitis," JISMS 30 (1940), 491-92; Joe M. Standerfer, "Acute
Poliomyelitis: A Study of the Patients Seen at the Raymond Blank Memorial
Hospital During 1946," JISMS 37 (1947), 362-66; A. V. Hardy, "Undulant
(Malta) Fever in Iowa," JlSMS 19 (1929), 483-84; Carl F. Jordon, "Problems in
the Control of Undulant Fever," JISMS 20 (1930) 507-10; L. R. Woodward,
"Brucellosis," JISMS 27 (1937),609-14.
34. "Occurrence of Malaria in Iowa," JISMS ,25 (1935), 558, 570; E. E. Munger
and E. E. Munger Jr., "A Case of Malaria," JISMS 27 (1937), 209-10; Walter
Bierring, "Malaria in the Upper Mississippi Valley," JISMS 30 (1940), 294-95;
James E. Greene, "Tropical Diseases in Iowa in the Postwar Era," JISMS 33
(1943), 455-60; Col. Paul F. Russell, "Malaria in Returning Service Personnel,"
JISMS 35 (1945), 247-53; Edward W. Paulus, "Malaria as a Postwar Problem in
Iowa," JISMS 37 (1947),12-17.

State Department of Health), representatives from parent and
teacher associations, and members of county medical societies to
ensure that any information distributed was physician-approved
and that doctors who participated were appropriately compensated. Physicians involved in running private laboratories in
1934 protested strongly when the State Department of Health
planned to maintain its "free" (tax-funded) clinical laboratory
services for testing blood, spinal fluid, and tissues for infectious
diseases, agreeing only that the state hygienic laboratory should
provide free tests for indigent patients. Otherwise, they maintained, individuals should be charged the same fees expected
from private laboratories. In 1950 the ISMS Board of Trustees
voiced its concern that the State Department of Health had
agreed to give the Iowa Heart Association "$10,000 and a truck
with x-ray" for the "diagnosis and treatment of heart conditions."
Diagnostic screening of "indigent or semi-indigent persons"
was in line with past initiatives, but "with the treatment part
being left to the private practice of medicine." The board called
for the ISMS to again scrutinize such well-meaning but illadvised plans that wandered over the fuzzy border separating
public health from private medical care.35
For physicians in the ISMS, a central goal running through
all of the economic, social, scientific, and international upheavals of the 1930s and 1940s was to remain, as Dr. Fay said, "unshackled by bureaucratic control" while the profession and the
practice of medicine was changing all around them. Yet, despite
the bravado of several outspoken leaders, there were just too
many factors that independent, individualistic physicians could
not control on their own. To resist "outside" dictates, they had
to face head on the increasingly unpleasant conflicts among idealized professional altruism, providing the best in up-to-date
science-based diagnostic tests and treatments, and the financial
bottom line: people who needed medical care could not, or
would not, pay their bills.
35. R. G. Leland, "Some Causes of Professional Unrest," JISMS 24 (1934), 603;
"Report of Committee on Child Health and Protection," JISMS 23 (1933), 422;
"The 1941 Summer Round-Up," JISMS 31 (1941), 167; "Report of the Medical
Economics Committee," JISMS 25 (1935), 405-7; "Supplemental Report of the
Board of Trustees," JISMS 40 (1950), 331.
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Medical Care and Poverty before the New Deal
Ralph Simmons, editor of the ISMS Journal, welcomed 1931with
an optimistic editorial, looking back on 1930 as a year "marked
by prosperity and much personal happiness" in the Midwest,
despite some "economic stress." Economic stress continued,
however, and Iowa physicians began to feel it keenly. At the
annual meeting of the ISMS in April, Dr. Hearst reported to
the society's House of Delegates on the activities of the recently
formed Committee on Indigent Physicians. Only a few povertystricken physicians had been identified, he said, but "it has been
intimated that if the bulls don't get busy in the stock market
there will be more of this class." A year later Dr. Hearst told the
delegates that no one had yet repoked any indigent physicians
requiring assistance from the state society. "The various county
societies had taken care" of needy colleagues, he noted. In 1933,
however, requests for aid had come in from three practitioners.
Dr. Ambor, then chair of the committee, found one "to require
emergency action." The ISMS Board of Trustees authorized a
temporary payment of $25 per month from the society's reserve
funds for this "truly needy physician." Critical members of the
society's House of Delegates, discovering that the decision violated the society's bylaws, challenged Dr. Ambor at the annual
ISMS meeting in 1934. Dr. Fay, for example, asked the House,
"Are you going into the insurance game and take care of these
people?" "Who is going to determine whether they are indigent
or whether they are not?" The House finally voted to disband
the committee and abandon any formal ISMS help for indigent
practitioners. Impoverished physicians, like so many others who
just could not manage as conditions worsened in towns and on
farms across the state, would have to rely on their neighbors,
charity, and public aid to get by.36
36. "A New Year's Reflection," JISMS 21 (1931), 32; "Report of Committee on
Indigent Physicians," JISMS 21 (1931), 400; "Physicians become Chauffeurs,"
JISMS 22 (1932), 550; "Report of the Committee on Superannuated Physicians," JISMS 22 (1932), 363; "Report of the Committee on Superannuated
Physicians," JISMS 24 (1934), 391, 394. Appeals to the AMA to set up a national benevolent fund for impoverished physicians were finally answered
when the Bureau of Medical Economics decided that the AMA could not get
into "the insurance business." "Report of the Delegates to the American Medical Association," JISMS 28 (1938), 324.

Between 1929 and 1932, the national average net income for
physicians in independent private practice dropped almost 44
percent, from $5,224 per year to $2,948. After 1932, however, the
average gradually rose again until, in 1943, the mean income
after business expenses reached $6,735.37 Most Iowa physicians
managed to make do through the leanest years in areas not affected too keenly by the ongoing droughts. According to a survey that the ISMS Journal sent out to members in 1935, just under two-thirds of Iowa physicians owned one car ("a Ford or a
Chevrolet"), which was two or more years old; the rest owned
two cars. Seventy-five percent owned electric refrigerators, 40
percent were planning home improvements, and most had kept
up payments on their life insurance policies. The author of the
report on this questionnaire regretted that it had not gathered
reliable information on the average Iowa physician's income, as,
"alas, his earnings and his collections are so widely different
that it is too uncertain to estimate."38
The difference between earnings on paper, tallied according
to fees charged, and what a physician actually collected in cash
(or kind) had burdened practitioners for hundreds of years.
Nineteenth- and early twentieth-century physicians were no
strangers to poverty or marginal incomes when they could not
attract enough well-to-do patients who paid their bills promptly
and fully. Physicians regularly extended personal credit to their
patients and arranged payment schedules that could keep their
clientele in debt to them for years. In the 1920s and 1930s, however, the cost of being a physician and running an independent
practice had risen dramatically with the reform of medical education and the introduction of expensive equipment for the doc37. William Weinfield, "Income of Physicians, 1929-49," Survey of Current Business 31 (1951), 10-11. Data presented in the AMA's Care of the Indigent Sick, rev.
ed. (Chicago, 1935),28, indicate that in 1929 an income of $5,500 for a family of
three put them in the "well-to-do" category. In 1934 the minimum income for
a family of five for basic needs, including a telephone and some recreation,
was $1,921. There are several ways to calculate the "value" of money in the
past in current terms. The results can vary widely depending upon the factors
considered meaningful to the economist and historian. To try such calculations
on the dollar amounts given in this article, consult MeasuringWorth.com
<www.measuringworth.com/calculators/compare~,
accessed 2/16/2007.
38. "An ~vera~e-1owa
Physician," ]ISMS 25 (1935), 559-60. The survey was
sent to all ISMS members; approximately 50 percent responded.

Iowa Physicians

.

-

-

7C-P

'-

.

-1

--

wZ
L

-

23

-

t F

3-

This image of a doctor's office in Scranton in about 1940 rqresents a
fairly typical "modem" doctor's office of the time. Photo jrom the Farm
Security Administration Collection, Libray of Congress.

tor's office. Keeping up with the latest developments, moreover,
required society dues, journal subscriptions, and, most of all,
travel to medical meetings, postgraduate courses, and refresher
clinics. Juggling expenses and income in these decades meant
that the physician had to learn to be a sound businessperson. As
one Iowa practitioner put it in 1933, "We have not yet learned to
cause our fees to collect in pens about our home so that when
they are needed we know that they are in the pen ready for us."
Instead, like hunting wild game, ordinary doctors had to stalk
their fees-a laborious and inefficient task. By the mid-1920s,
some collection agencies specialized in getting payments from
patients for a percentage of the bills owed. Physicians turned to
such agencies when they simply could not afford to write off all
of their bad debts, but this must have been an uncomfortable
process in close-knit communities.39
39. W. L. Allen, "Our Profession Needs to Revolutionize its Business Methods," Iowa Medical Journal 15 (1908-1909), 394-97; Ezra L. Wurtzer, "Medical
Economics," JISMS 21 (1931), 34143; G. Hubert Artis, letter to "The Open
Forum," JISMS 23 (1933), 526; "Commercial Collection Agencies," in the "Report of Committee on Medical Economics," JISMS 21 (1931), 392-93; [Letter to
the editor from E. Burd; Editor's reply], JISMS 16 (1926), 509-10.
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The "National School of Honesty" advertised regularly
in the Journal of the Iowa State Medical Society in
the 1930s and 1940s. This ad appeared in March 1935.

Physicians' problems with fees and payments also stemmed
from another long-standing tradition in medical practice: the
sliding scale and physicians' personal generosity with their time.
It was well known that physicians charged their poorer patients
less for the same services than they charged those with adequate
means, and that sometimes they charged nothing at all. By the
late 1920s, the individual physician's freedom to use a sliding
scale and extend credit had created considerable dissension in
the profession. On one hand, physicians prized their flexibility
with payment as part of their autonomy as practitioners and as
a fundamental expression of the altruism of medicine itself. Independence in caring for those in need according to their own
clinical judgments without regard for personal gain was a
deeply held value, intertwined with feelings about self-respect
and community regard. Practitioners feared that talk of business efficiency and payment demands threatened their patients'
trust in them and stimulated public opinion that doctors were
arrogant and money-grubbing. On the other hand, the variation
in physicians' fees had long been seen as fueling competition
among practitioners and encouraging quackery, contract practice, incompetent medical care, and bitter divisiveness in the
profession. The very altruism that gave physicians pride, more-
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over, "gives the layman a chance to play us for 'suckers,' if he so
chooses," Dr. Wurtzer of Clear Lake noted in 1931. "Some of the
disrespect and disregard that some of the people have for the
medical profession," Dr. Wurtzer continued, "is due . . . in part
to our slothful methods of business dealings with the public."40
Concern over physicians' billing autonomy versus the collective good of the profession was one of the issues motivating
the formation of medical societies, including the American Medical Association, in the nineteenth century. Some city and county
medical societies occasionally put together suggested fee schedules suitable for their areas, but prosperous practitioners and
specialists complained that "suggested fees too quickly became "maximum" fees and that "cheap doctors" were always
willing to undercut respectable 0nes.4~
Society-based fee schedules as a partial solution to the wide
variation in medical charges also became problematic with the
passage of workers' compensation laws in the first decades of
the twentieth century. Iowa's law passed in 1913 and went into
effect on July 1, 1914.42 Such laws required that employers pay
for the medical care and time off required when an industrial
worker was injured on the job and it was not the worker's fault.
(The law did not apply to farm labor, nor did it include workrelated diseases.) To fund this responsibility, Iowa employers
established a private insurance association (the Employers Mutual Casualty Association of Iowa), which entered into contracts
with physicians around the state to provide medical services as
the need arose, with a legislated limit of $100 for medical costs
per injury. The insurance association determined which physi40. J. N. McCormack, "Medical Economics-A General Plan for a Schedule of
Medical Fees," Iowa Medical Journal 15 (1908-1909), 393; Ben G. Budge, "Honesty in Medicine," JISMS 21 (1931), 482-84; "The Business of Medicine," JISMS
17 (1927), 137; Ezra L. Wurtzer, "Medical Economics," JISMS 21 (1931), 341-43;
"Physicians and Fees," JISMS 23 (1933), 625; Cleon C. Mason, "The Business of
Doctoring," North American Review 226 (1928), 737-42. See also T. Swann Harding, "The High Cost of Doctoring," North American Review 226 (1928), 390-98.
41. McCormack, "Medical Economics," 390-91.
42. "Employer's Liability or Workmen's Compensation," JlSMS 3 (1913-14),
762-66; "Accident Insurance," ]ISMS 3 (1913-1914), 769-75. For a general discussion of workers' compensation legislation, see Theda Skocpol, Protecting
Soldiers and Mothers: The Political Origins of Social Policy in the United States
(Cambridge, MA, 1992); and Hoffman, Wages of Sickness.

cian took care of an injured employee and, with the contract
system, also determined the fees. The association argued that
since physicians would be assured of prompt payment, they
should be happy with half their normal charge -indeed, what
they might have expected a worker to be able to pay anyway.
Fee schedules generated by county medical societies provided
evidence that insurance companies used to establish the customary charges that they could discount.43
Physicians' responses to workers' compensation in Iowa heralded later reactions to legislative solutions to m a n a p g health
care and medical practice. Some were horrified and adamantly
denounced all forms of contract practice, but offered few ideas
about what should be done about it or about workers' compensation laws. Others counseled cooperation with the state and
insurance companies, as interference with medical costs was inevitable, given all the political discussion about European systems of state medicine for industrial workers and the popular
lure of "free" health care. Still others urged action and physician solidarity. The physicians of Poweshiek County, for example, banded together in 1916 and refused to sign any contracts
with the Employers Mutual Casualty Association. Those who
handled casualty cases in the county were "getting decent, respectable fees for their work" as a result of their unified resistance. Getting all local physicians to cooperate, however, was a
daunting task. Contract practice did offer some payment security, after all. It allowed "young men to obtain a start" in business and, of course, provided an income to those who could not
get patients any other way. Insurance companies, observed Dr.
Wahrer of Fort Madison in 1915, "know they can find a taker"
in contrast to "butchers, grocers, brick layers, carpenters, farm43. D. S. Fairchild, "The Effects of the Workmen's Compensation Law on the
Profession," JISMS 6 (1916), 161; "Report of the Committee on Workmen's
Compensation," JISMS 7 (1917), 284; Oliver J. Fay, "The Relation of the Doctor
to the Iowa Workmen's Compensation Service," JISMS 9 (1919), 120-21,12425. By the early 1930s, the ISMS'S Committee on Medical Economics had the
task of negotiating a recommended statewide minimum fee schedule for all
compensation cases. See "Report of the Committee on Medical Economics,"
JISMS 23 (1933), 414-16. For details on the management of workers' compensation in specific cases in Iowa, see A. B. Funk, "Report of Decisions by the Department and State Courts," in State of Iowa, Report of Workmen's Compensation Service, 1930, Legislative Documents, vol. 3.
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ers, char-women, scavengers or motormen," who, he implied,
had more sense. "Above everything else," Dr. Schilling urged,
"the doctor should maintain his self-respect, and when one of
these contracts is presented to him and it involves the degradation of his profession, he should refuse to sign it."44
Smoldering alongside resentment of workers' compensation
contract practice was similar animosity toward contract practice
for the care of the indigent sick in Iowa's counties. By state law
every county was responsible for supporting indigent residents
with the minimal necessities of life, including basic medical
treatment, paid for by county taxes and managed by the
county's board of supervisors.45 In 1928 all but two of Iowa's
counties had a poor farm, where those with no other options
were sent. Such residential facilities were considered the most
cost-effective way of feeding and sheltering the homeless indigent, along with the aged and disabled whose families (if they
had family) did not have enough resources to care for them.
The able-bodied on the farms labored with stock and crops, but
sales of their produce rarely covered the expenses for maintaining the property, providing clothing and food for the inmates,
and paying for medicine and doctors' visits.46 Counties also
used "outdoor" relief, that is, payments for those who still had
their own homes but no means of support, such as women with
dependent children. In addition, counties had to pay for the
44. "The Doctor's Economic Relationship," JISMS 10 (1920), 123-26; Donald L.
Madison, "Preserving Individualism in the Organizational Society: 'Cooperation' and American Medical Practice, 1900-1920," Bulletin of the Histoy of
Medicine 70 (1996),442-83; Fairchild, "Effects of the Workmen's Compensation
Law," 158-63; Clinton E. Harris, "Co-operation: What does it Mean?" JISMS 6
(1916),10,163.
45. Marilyn Olson, "Sick and Poor in Cedar County: Local Government and
the Poorhouse, 1857-1890," unpublished paper presented at the Newbeny
Library Seminar in Rural History, 2/24/2007. Olson provides important data
on how a county government dealt with paying physicians for the care of the
poor in the nineteenth century.
46. Report of the Auditor of State for the Biennial Period Ending June 30, 1930 (Des
Moines, 1930). Tables 12 and 13 give county home expenses and income from
the sale of produce for 1928, for example. In 1928,97 of Iowa's 99 counties had
poor farms, with 2,425 poor and 1,459 insane inmates; one county had a farm
where indigents worked, but the building for the residents had been condemned. Costs for medicine and medical attendance for county home residents totaled $29,247, or 2.2 percent of the $1,310,183 expended.

cost of resident indigents confined in one of the state hospitals
for the insane. The voters of each county decided on the tax rate
for poor relief. Most counties were reasonably generous, levying more for the poor than for county road building in 1928, for
instance, but others were decidedly parsimonious.47
When faced with seriously ill indigent children and adults,
county authorities could send them to the UI hospital, where
their medical costs would be covered by state funds under the
Perkins Law and the Haskell-Klaus Law, up to a mandated cap
of one million dollars per year.48 In the late 1920s and early
1930s, problems with the ways some counties used more than
their fair share of Perkins-Haskell-Klaus support, concern that
patients who could be treated locally -with local physicians
and hospitals deserving the income- were being sent away unnecessarily, rumors that some patients were not really indigent,
and the start of long waiting lists for beds in Iowa City led to in47. State Board of Assessment and Review, Taxable Valuation of Property (Des
Moines, 1929).Table 2, Part IV breaks down all taxes levied for 1928. The mills
assessed for the poor ranged from the unusually low .55 for Osceola County to
a high of 3.01 for Van Buren; the majority of counties assessed 3.00 mills for
poor relief.
48. Lawrence, "Iowa Physicians," part two, 24,43.
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FIGURE 2
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SOURCES:
Compiled horn State of Iowa, Report of the Auditor of State, for biennial periods ending in even years, 1926-1950. The health care costs for the county poor include
physicians' fees, hospital and nursing charges, and drug costs for poor farm residents
and those on outdoor relief.

vestigations by the state legislature and the ISMS. Negotiations
among university administrators, medical society leaders, and
state legislators led to reforms in the committal procedures to
prevent abuses, but the rap in funding to the university hospital
during the Depression meant that counties could not rely on the
state's hospitals to relieve them of all the costs of their sickest
poor (see fig. 2).49 As the state's auditors' reports reveal, local ex49. Levey et al., University Teaching Hospital, 146-65, covers this controversy in
detail from the University Hospital's perspective. This account does not discuss county-level work for the medical needs of the indigent. See also "Report
of the Committee on Medical Economics," JISMS 21 (1931),393; "Iowa Assembly Investigates University Hospital," JISMS 23 (1933), 221-25; "Supplementary Report of the Committee on Medical Education and Hospitals," JISMS 23
(1933), 400404; Bowen, "The Present Status of Medicine," 146; Gordon F.
Harkness, "The President Elect's Address: Why Are We Here and Where Are
We Going?" JISMS 24 (1934),274-77.
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SOURCE:
Compiled from State of Iowa, Report of the Auditor of State, for biennial periods ending in even years, 1926-1950. Professional services include fees for physicians
and dentists. These figures do not include amounts indirectly paid for medical services
through FERA or FSA programs.

penditures on health care climbed sigruficantly in this period, just
as payments for fuel, food, and clothing for the poor also rose
(see fig. 3).
Most county boards tried to budget a fixed amount for local
indigent medical costs and, physicians constantly complained,
tried to pay as little as possible for them. One popular method
from the 1870s through the 1930s was to ask local physicians to
submit sealed bids for an annual contract for services to the indigent and to accept the lowest one. Other county boards simply
paid whatever fraction of the bills that physicians submitted that
the boards thought the care was worth, which was nearly always 50 percent or less.50 The AMA and the ISMS officially de-

--

--

50. Olson, "Sick and Poor in Cedar County;" Harris, "Co-operation: What
Does It Mean?" 10; AMA, Care of the Indigent Sick, 33-36.
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plored contract practice for indigent care, with one notable exception: when all of the physicians in a county medical society
joined together to bid, as a group, for the contract. If voluntarily
taken on by organized medicine, a contract that excluded physicians who did not belong to the AMA was considered professionally acceptable, as long as all M-affiliated physicians
could participate. Because this unusual idea was dreamed up in
Iowa, such a collective contract became nationally known as the
"Iowa Plan" by the early 1930s.51
The physicians of the Black Hawk County Medical Society tried
this collective initiative in 1907, well before the hard times of the
Depression.52 In that year, they voted "to go before the county
board of supervisors at the April meeting, and to underbid
anyone who put in a bid to do the county poor work." The supervisors agreed to their proposal, and the medical society got
the contract for $830 per year. Within a few years, "the physicians of Cedar Falls and Hudson preferred to make their own
arrangements to care for the poor in their respective townships,"
and the Waterloo Medical Society also decided that working at
the city and township level made the most sense in Black Hawk
County. In 1912 the Waterloo Medical Society decided to incorporate as a non-profit organization in order to reduce the personal financial responsibility of the society's officers, and, by
1916, had used the contract funds for a variety of projects useful
51. Leland, "Some Causes of Professional Unrest," 604. The use of the phrase
"Iowa Plan" by physicians may easily be confused with the "Iowa Plan" developed by the Bureau of Social Welfare in the Extension Division of the State
University of Iowa to have professional social workers coordinate all public
and private relief efforts at the city or county level. See Bessie McClenahan,
The Iowa Plan for the Combination of Public and Private Relief (Iowa City, 1918);
Louise Cottrell, Iowa Plan for the Organization of a County Social Service League
(Iowa City, 1924), and Ina Tyler, comp., The Iowa Plan for the County Organization of Social Work (Iowa City, 1931). There may well be connections between
these "Iowa Plans," but physicians do not acknowledge them in the articles
cited here.
52. According to data provided by Robert A. Parker in "Care of the Indigent
Sick by Medical Society Contract," JISMS 21 (1931), 17, the Hardin County
Medical Society started its collective contract arrangement in 1904. This has
not yet been confirmed in the county's board of supervisors records. This earlier venture was not mentioned in the first accounts about county medical
society contracts published in the JISMS cited below.

for society members and the community. They set up x-ray services in two Waterloo hospitals and equipped a clinical laboratory in town, for example, which were supposed to eventually
generate enough fees to be self-supporting.53
Only 11local medical societies had county contracts in 1930
(see table 3), but by 1933, 30 local medical societies had taken
on the responsibility for local indigent care, based on an annual
fixed sum or on a negotiated percentage of the minimum fee
schedule devised by the ISMS that year.54 In a decided show of
communal good will, moreover, before 1933 most of the societies put some or all of the county contract funds into the society's treasury, where it was used to cover members' dues to the
ISMS. The societies spent the remaining money on expenses for
their meetings, particularly to bring in outside speakers for their
programs.55 The Jefferson County Medical Society even used
this income to pay its members' premiums for group malpractice insurance, a nice inducement for non-members to join up.56
Dr. Parker of Des Moines, reporting on the 11medical society county contracts operating in 1930, stressed how much this
collective use of contract funds helped in "the advancement of
organized medicine," as it enhanced "the unity and fellowship
among the members." Most reports from the county medical societies presented at the annual meetings of the ISMS in the early
1930s confirmed Dr. Parker's rosy assessment, although a few
were less cheerful. Dr. Stirlen bluntly stated in 1934 that raising
the idea to seek a county contract in 1933 "was the begintung of
53. W. B. Small, "President's Address-Iowa State Medical Society: An Experience in Medical Co-operation," JISMS 6 (1916),24143.
54. "Report of the Medical Economics Committee," JJSMS 23 (1933), 364; "Report of the Secretary," JJSMS 24 (1934), 352. For an example of a contract, see
"Excellent Contract for Guthrie County Indigent Sick," JJSMS 22 (1932), 14748. For brief descriptions of meetings to discuss negotiations with the county
board of supervisors, see meetings of 1/27/1928 and 5/22/1930 in the Bremer
County Medical Society Records, 1903-1950, State Historical Society of Iowa,
Iowa City. These efforts do not seem to have been successful. A rnimeographed copy of the 1933 ISMS fee bill was pasted into this volume, as well.
55. Parker, "Care of the Indigent Sick by Medical Society Contract," 17. A version of this report was published in the American Medical Association Bulletin
the month before it appeared in the state journal.
56. "Reports from Councilor Districts," JISMS 21 (1931), 373.
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our troubles" in the Keokuk County Medical Society. "It nearly
caused the death of the Society," he claimed, but at least it succeeded in bringing "to the surface the men who are for organized
medicine and those who are for their own selfish purposes."57
The contract arrangements for seeing patients varied considerably, but before 1934 all of them allowed patients free choice
from among the physicians who belonged to the society. To attend to patients who did not have a chosen practitioner, some
societies rotated their members through periods of service; others expected the closest physician to handle cases as they came
up. In Davenport, Sioux City, and Des Moines, the county medical societies established clinics staffed by volunteers, in which
specialists contributed their services to indigent patients referred
from a general practitioner. Whatever the details of the contract,
county societies frequently reported how much the services they
provided were worth compared with the amount they were paid.
The Muscatine County Medical Society noted, for example, that
in 1932 it dispensed $13,877 worth of work for a $3,600 contract.
That was hardly satisfactory, but a few societies discovered that
if they insisted on better terms without complete cooperation
from all physicians, then the board of supervisors would give
the contract to a single practitioner or simply dealt with individual physicians' claims for payment as they came in, with
their usual tendency to pay less than the fees billed.58
As national attention focused on how to deal with the growing number of people who had lost their livelihoods and could
barely manage to survive, much less pay for doctors, the way
some Iowa county medical societies collectively shouldered indigent medical care became more widely known. In the final
report of the national Committee on the Costs of Medical Care
(1932),its authors briefly described Iowa's innovation in county57. Parker, "Care of the Indigent Sick," 17; "Reports from Councilor Districts,"
JISMS 24 (1934), 363. In 1932 the Hamilton County Medical Society named two
members who "have not signed [the] contract and are not considered members."
"Reports from Councilor Districts," JlSMS 23 (1933), 387.
58. John I. Marker, "The County Contract and Clinic," ]ISMS 20 (1930), 86-88;
"Three Iowa Societies Tackle Health Center Problem," JISMS 20 (1930), 89;
"Interesting News," JlSMS 23 (1933), 110; "Reports from Councilor Districts,"
JISMS 24 (1934), 361-62; "Reports from Councilor Districts," JlSMS 24 (1934),
359,361,363.
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TABLE 3 (cont.)

Washington
County

Each patient selects own physician

In society treasury for
expenses, dues, etc.

Jefferson County

Eight members rotate monthly; two
eye, ear, nose, and throat doctors

In society treasury for
expenses, dues, etc.

Mahaska County

Cases rotate; each physician follows
each case to completion

In society treasury for
expenses, dues, and
society endowment

Scott County

Rotating staff at clinicldispensary

In society treasury for
expenses, dues, etc.

Council Bluffs

One physician answers emergency and
house calls. Rotate 3-month periods at
dispensary and hospital

In society treasury

SOURCE:
Robert L. Parker, "Care of the Indigent Sick by Medical Society Contract,"
JISMS 21 (1931), 18-19. See Parker's article for the full table, which includes information
on the coverage of major surgery, minor surgery, venereal diseases, and cost of serums,
antitoxins, and medicines.

level indigent care, but criticized it as "not well-integrated with
other services, especially hospital care, and poor in its attention to
"preventive work." Medical society contract practice for the indigent provided "inadequate" compensation for physicians and,
perhaps most damning, was found, "with one exception, only in
small rural communities." The committee had sought solutions
to concerns about access to up-to-date health services for all
Americans, so it is not surprising that they did not see much
promise in medical society contracts that were limited to care of
the very poor. The American Medical Association, in contrast,
praised the "Iowa Plan" for its creative response to indigent
needs and championed it as a model for managing the expansion of state and federal funding that came with the election of a
liberal, Democratic president promising a "New Dea1."59

"Government" Medicine:
The New Deal and Organized Medicine in Iowa
One of President Roosevelt's first steps in office in 1933 was to
secure passage of the Federal Emergency Relief Act, which gave
the Federal Emergency Relief Administration (FERA) a sweeping mandate to relieve Americans' economic distress by putting
the unemployed back to work and, where absolutely necessary,
sending direct aid to destitute communities. Iowa first received
funds via Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) and Civil Works
Administration (CWA) employment projects in the late winter
and early spring of 1933-34.60 Federal funds were channeled
through the Iowa Emergency Relief Administration (IERA), the
59. Leland, "Some Causes of Professional Unrest," 604; "Medical Society Experiments in Care of the Indigent," JISMS 29 (1939), 517; Medical Care for the
American People, 74-75; "Report of the Secretary," JISMS 25 (1935), 356; AMA,
Care of the Indigent Sick, 40,49-50.
60. The regulations for CWA work required that the government pay for medical care for employees injured on the job or made ill by diseases caused by the
occupation. ISMS physicians were pleasantly surprised by the CWA rules, as
they specified that local administrators had to "consult the officers of their
county or district medical society" to set up medical aid and to pay for "reasonable medical and hospital services and supplies." "Medical Care of CWA
Workmen," JISMS 24 (1934), 108; Oliver J. Fay, "The Test of Organized Medicine," JISMS 24 (1934), 206. For CCC work, see "Physicians Wanted," JISMS 24
(1934), 586.
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state government agency responsible for coordinating relief efforts, ensuring compliance with FERA (and other) regulations,
dealing with disputes among counties, collecting data on neediness, and monitoring how money was spent. By early 1935, more
than one-third of Iowa's county governments were essentially
bankrupt, having reached the maximum amount that they
could borrow against the promise of future tax revenues.61
FERA regulations emphasized the importance of working
with state and local professional societies for medicine, pharmacy, and nursing when setting up plans to deal with health
needs, especially when devising fee schedules for local services.
Any medical plans were to respect the "traditional family and
family-physician relationship" as far as possible, with care to
maintain a minimum level "consistent with good professional
judgment."62 By the end of 1934, ISMS officers were deep into
discussions with the IERA directors about ways to support
county medical relief budgets with state and FERA funds. IERA
administrators appointed Dr. Thomas C. Denny, who had spent
most of his career employed by the Central Life Assurance Company of Iowa, as director of IERA medical services. He was a
fortunate choice, according to the ISMS leadership, as he understood physicians' points of view, but his task was not an easy
one. If a county accepted state and federal money, it had to sign
on to a centrally regulated program. A certain percentage of the
total relief funds coming into each county would be targeted for
all medical needs, "and there will be no addition." The central
relief office set up "an emergency fee schedule," as well. Dr.
Denny stressed that these were "to be accepted as no criterion
whatsoever of what a proper fee arrangement should be." Individual physicians had to sign on to the agreement in order to be
"eligible to give medical relief service."63 The federal government
61. Report of the Activities of the Iowa Emergency ReliefAdministration for the Period
J a n u a y 1933 through December 1934 (Des Moines, 1935), 7. Reports were also
printed in 1936 (for 1935),1937 (for 1936), and 1938 (for 1937).
62. AMA, Care of the Indigent Sick, 48, quoting from the 1933 FERA Rules and
Regulations.
63. Gordon F. Harkness, "The President's Interim Report to the Members,"
JISMS 25 (1935), 3-4; "Medical Relief in Iowa," JISMS 25 (1935), 100; T. C.
Denny, "Medical Relief Program," JISMS 25 (1935), 153-55. See also Report of
the Activities of the IERA (1936), 22-23.

dissolved the FERA in 1935, largely because it simply was not
working, but Iowa continued to maintain its own office to coordinate emergency relief and distribute meager state funds to
needy counties.
Throughout the rest of the 1930s, local arrangements for indigent medical care varied according to the disparities in economic recovery in different parts of the state, the degree of organization within county medical societies, and the cordiality
(or lack thereof) between physicians and county boards of supervisors. In the poorest areas, physicians seemed resigned to
get what they could simply to support themselves; in other areas
conditions were "exceptionally satisfactory" by 1936.64 It did
not help that physicians in Van Buren County received nearly
100 percent of their billed fees for medical relief work while
their county was on the IERA relief roll, but Page County IERA
authorities imposed large across-the-board cuts on physicians'
charges in that county. "The medical profession is the only
group which is asked . . . to accept payment on such an unsatisfactory basis," observed Dr. Treynor of Pottawattamie County.
Such complaints ended up in the lap of the ISMS leadership, especially the members of the Committee on Medical Economics,
who tried to resolve them at the state leve1.65
In 1937 the ISMS Committee on Medical Economics confronted representatives of the Rural Resettlement Administration (reorganized into the Farm Security Administration [FSA]
later that year) over yet another plan that threatened to alienate
Iowa doctors even further. The FSA was set up to make limited
outright grants and systematic loans to farmers for the supplies
they needed to get back into production under a quota system
for agricultural products. The watchword was rehabilitation,
not relief. Medical expenses were not included in the budgets
drawn up with FSA agents, and physicians discovered that
farmers who promised to pay them when their FSA loan checks
came in always seemed to spend all their cash before putting
some towards the doctor's bills. That was not unusual, of course,
64. Ernest E. Shaw, "Various Medical Relief Plans in Iowa," JISMS 27 (1937,
589-91; "Reports from Councilor Districts," JISMS 27 (1937,340.
65. "Reports from Councilor Districts," JISMS 27 (1937, 340, 343; "Report of
the Committee on Medical Economics," JISMS 27 (1937, 349-50.
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but the physicians expected that since the farmers were enrolled
in a federal program, one that promised rehabilitation and ensured that their clients paid full price for seed and stock, they
should wisely include medical care under the necessities of
life.66
Because there were relatively few FSA clients in Iowa compared with the numbers in other states, the ISMS reluctantly
agreed to a new, rather experimental plan, which the medical
societies in Wayne and Crawford counties accepted on a trial
basis. Each farmer in the loan program was to come up with an
annual family medical budget in consultation with his or her
regular physician, using the ISMS fee schedule and excluding
estimates for surgery. That amount would be added to the loan
and the funds deposited with a "bonded trustee" picked by the
county medical society. If, at the end of the year, funds remained,
they would be returned to the client. If, on the other hand, the
family needed additional care, the physician would have to
provide it without charge.67
The description of this arrangement published in the ISMS
Journal stressed that it was merely proper budgeting and saving,
which all families should do, rather than a pre-payment plan of
any sort.68 But it was yet another system that left physicians both
underpaid and providing free service for unanticipated needs.
By the end of 1938, the ISMS Medical Economics Committee
and the state FSA administrators agreed that the medical funds
budgeted for all FSA clients in a county would be deposited as
a pooled account with a bonded representative chosen by the
county medical society. That money would be used to cover
-

-

66. "Report of the Committee on Medical Economics," JISMS 27 (1937, 349-51;
"Meeting of the Medical Economics Committee," JISMS 27 (1937, 439, 444;
"Rural Resettlement Program in Iowa," JISMS 27 (1937,493-96.
67. "The Medical Program of the Farm Security Administration," JlSMS 28
(1938), 108-9.
68. The idea that people with an income below a certain amount should be
strongly encouraged-or forced -to have supervised medical savings accounts
appears occasionally in these years. See, for example, G. Hubert Artis, "The
Open Forum" [letter to the editor about Artis's plan for a "medical budget
board in each community], PSMS 23 (1933), 526-27; James C. Hill, "Health
Insurance Is Not the Remedy," JISMS 25 (1935), 444. Hill attributes the idea to
Gustav Hartz, a German labor economist.

medical costs, including emergency surgery but not expensive
drugs (such as insulin) or operations for stable chronic conditions (such as hernia), based on a discounted fee schedule. At
the end of year, the county medical society could keep any surplus or, as usual, the physicians who cared for the FSA clients
would file their unpaid bills with their other uncollectible debts.69
It was, obviously, an insurance plan-and an insurance plan
involving federal money, with lay employees of the government monitoring it in the background.
Several county delegates at the 1939 ISMS annual meeting
were appalled. Stories about the FSA program had circulated in
the state: physicians were only getting ten cents on the dollar
for their work; clients burdened doctors with trivial calls and
demands; FSA clients were not officially indigent, so their
neighbors expected the same reduced charges. "If there ever
was a step made toward state medicine, this is it," proclaimed
Dr. Harman, a general practitioner from Whiting (pop. 627), to
the ISMS House of Delegates. The plan had received "unholy
publicity . . . through the editorials in the Des Moines Register,"
presumably with the permission of the ISMS. "Look at the Dakotas and Oklahoma and see what has happened," Dr. Harman
continued, pointing to states where physicians had resigned
themselves to participate in large-scale FSA-run medical collectives. His county medical society (Monona, in far western Iowa)
had refused to have anything to do with the FSA program, and
he wanted the ISMS to refuse to accept it anywhere in the state.
Others urged the delegates to see the counties trying the FSA
plan simply as "an experimental laboratory." The plan was not
being forced on every county with FSA clients; that decision remained in the control of the county medical societies, and physicians were not required to participate, although they would
have to give up their FSA patients if they refused.
Dr. Shaw, the beleaguered chair of the Medical Economics
Committee, reminded the meeting that the House of Delegates
69. "Program for Medical Care of Farm Security Administration Clienfs in
Iowa," JISMS 28 (1938)' 628-29; "Program for Farm Security Administration
Clients," Circular letter from E. E. Shaw to all county secretaries, 1/18/1939,
in Butler County Medical Society Collection, State Historical Society of Iowa,
Iowa City.
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had asked the commitfee to look into pre-payment plans. "There
are some doctors who believe we must go ahead with plans if
we are to forestall state medicine," he noted. At the end of this
acerbic discussion, the House of Delegates voted not to accept
the section of the Medical Economics Committee's report covering the FSA system, which was tantamount to censuring the
committee's work that would have allowed the plan to be implemented in two of Iowa's counties. That action did not stop
the plans, but it certainly removed the Medical Economics Committee's ability to negotiate effectively with FSA administrators
on behalf of the ISMS membership. After that, county medical
societies dealt with FSA proposals on their 0 ~ 1 1 . 7 0
Dr. Harman's ire at the FSA group pre-payment plan represents the effect of decades of pronouncements from the AMA,
the ISMS, and hundreds of physicians who denounced all forms
of contract practice, pre-payment plans, voluntary insurance, and
compulsory insurance, whether organized by private companies
or by the government. Any arrangement that might involve regulated oversight of the financial relationship between an individual practitioner and his or her individual patient spelled
ruin for medicine, proclaimed the loudest voices. Identifying
pre-payment plans that would require any form of tax support
for employed people as "socialistic" played on diffuse political
and cultural fears of threats to American democracy and individualism from the early days of World War 1.71 Voluntary insurance plans, the argument went, inevitably led to compulsory
ones, and hence straight into state medicine. In the late 1920s,
when workers' compensation laws in some states expanded to
cover medical care for specific industrial diseases, physicians
bemoaned this tiny slide down the slippery slope. The expansion of veterans' benefits in 1924 to cover medical costs due to
70. "Report of Medical Economics Committee," JISMS 29 (1939), 33940,349-50;
"Report of Medical Economics Committee," JISMS 30 (1940), 330-31. For details of the federally sponsored programs in North and South Dakota, see Grey,
New Deal Medicine, 4247 and, for the expansion and trials of FSA plans in
other states, 53-69.
71. For detailed analysis of the political complexities surrounding the AMA,
compulsory health insurance, and American society in the mid-twentieth century,see Gordon, Dead on Am'val.

some non-war-related disabilities after World War I similarly
pointed to a dire future."
At the same time that federal politicians and administrators
were implementing projects to deal with emergency conditions
in the early years of the New Deal, Roosevelt's coterie also
launched plans for longer-term programs for the unemployed,
disabled, and elderly. At the start, these plans included a system
of national health insurance, which immediately encountered
determined resistance from the leaders of the AMA. Iowa's Dr.
Walter Bierring, who had retired from active medical practice
to serve as the Commissioner of the State Department of Health
in 1933, was president of the AMA in 1934-35, and Roosevelt's
Committee on Economic Security appointed him as a member
of its Medical Advisory Board in the fall of 1934. Bierring later
claimed that the Medical Advisory Board had played a key role
in keeping health insurance out of the draft legislation that the
Committee on Economic Security presented in January 1935.
Certainly that blue-ribbon panel had influence, as did the strong
position the AMA adopted, at a special session of its House of
Delegates in February 1935 over which Bierring presided, "to
condemn all efforts at regimentation of the medical profession
and lay control of medical practice."73
The final provisions of the Social Security Act, which Roosevelt signed on August 14,1935, did bring unemployment insurance, disability insurance, and old-age pensions to Americans,
along with federal resources for some health-related needs, especially those of children. Title V and Title VI provided grantsin-aid (some requiring matching state funds) for maternal and
child health, state public health services, hospitalization and
medical care for crippled children, and support for homeless,
72. Morris Fishbein, A History of the American Medical Association, 1847 to 1947
(Philadelphia, 1947), 374; "Forerunners of Sickness Insurance," ]ISMS 21
(1931)' 311-12; Bowen, "The Present Status of Medicine," 146; Arthur C.
Christie, "The Socialization of Medicine-To What Extent Is It Desirable?"
JISMS 26 (1936), 499.
73. Walter Bierring, "Federalization of the Practice of Medicine," JISMS 34
(1944), 26; Lloyd C. Taylor, The Medical Profession and Social Reform, 1885-1945
(New York, 1974), 128-32; Walter Bierring, "Special Session, House of Delegates, American Medical Association, Chicago, February 15, 16, 1935," ]ISMS
25 (1935), 152; Stan; Social Transformation, 266-70.
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Walter Bierring, an important jigure in Iowa and
American medical history, was Commissioner of
edical Association,

neglected, and mistreated children. Thomas Burcham, president
of the ISMS in 1935-36, pronounced all of these worthy measures. There was a resounding lack of protest in the state journal
over the next years as Social Security funding-albeit a modest
amount-paid physicians for diagnostic clinics ($3 per hour)
and follow-up visits ($1 per visit) for crippled and chronically ill
children around the state, as well as for treatment at the UI hospital. Money to expand the State Department of Health's staff,
to establish county health units with public health nurses, and

to offer refresher courses in obstetrics and pediatrics for Iowa
physicians also came through the Social Security program.74
With Dr. Bierring as Commissioner of Health (and quite influential in the way Social Security health resources were distributed and administered), it is perhaps not surprising that during
these years Iowa doctors only occasionally expressed fears that
their expanding public health services competed unfairly with
private practitioners. The Social Security Act nevertheless rankled physicians, for it represented another step in "government controlled services" that, without their constant vigilance,
would provide the framework for the complete "socialization of
medicine." 75
The inflated language of some physicians' warnings in the
1920s and 1930s, especially when they foresaw that any trajectory toward "socialism" would not stop until "sovietism" -with
doctors merely state employees subsisting on meager salariesdid seem hysterical to more sanguine contemporaries, as it has
to observers in the post-Medicare and Medicaid era. Some have
interpreted the vehemence of physicians' expressions largely as
a rhetorical strategy to frighten Americans into supporting the
AMA's official positions on various issues. Because urban specialists dominated the AMA's national committees and offices,
and similar men tended to be chosen as state delegates to AMA
meetings, AMA positions have regularly been interpreted as
serving the economic interests of a self-absorbed, wealthy, professional elite, and not those of small-town and rural general practitioners. 76 Evidence of disagreements and controversies within
state medical societies, between state societies and the AMA,
and between other physicians' organizations and the AMA in
the 1930s supports the contention that many ordinary doctors
were willing to consider both voluntary pre-payment plans and
some measure of federal funding for medical care quite apart
74. Thomas Burcham, "President's Address," JISMS 26 (1936), 332-33; Walter
Bierring, "The Social Security Act: Proposed Plan of Operation in Iowa," JISMS
25 (1935), 684-87; "The Present Status of the Medical Social Security Programs
in Iowa," JISMS 27 (1937), 122-25.
75. "The Need for Cooperative Planning," JISMS 27 (1937), 217.
76. Stan; Social Transfornation, 271-75; Oliver Garceau, The Political Life of the
American Medical Association (Cambridge, MA, 1941), 24-61; Grey, New Deal
Medicine, 42-47,66.
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from the emergency conditions brought by the Depression.
AMA leaders heaped scorn upon physicians who dared to express such views. Such doctors, Dr. R. G. Leland, then director
of the AMA's Bureau of Medical Economics, told the annual
meeting of the ISMS in 1934, were those "who would sell out
the medical profession for a mess of pottage."77
Iowa physicians, like so many others, had to come to terms
with the conviction that protecting their independence required
collective unity and loyalty to the AMA system of county and
state medical societies, even if they did not agree completely
with the national organization's platform.78 Dr. Bowen of Fort
Dodge urged that dissenting physicians be "controlled first by
moral suasion, and second, by suspension or expulsion from the
county society." Dr. Henry Young, an ophthalmologist from
Burlington, bluntly laid it out for readers of the ISMS Journal.
The AMA, he stated, had long pretended to be a "scientific
body" when its main purpose had really been, and certainly
was, "politics." He had been quite satisfied with belonging to
his specialty societies, and his "twenty years of isolation (outside the pale of organized medicine) was, in itself, proof that the
medical man, seriously and honestly disposed, did not need
the organization as much as the organization needed him." But
conditions had changed. Membership in the AMA, he argued,
"should be compulsory, under pain of ostracism." Addressing
an obvious objection, he continued, "Sounds like trade unionism, doesn't it? Well, like it or not, that's the least of the degradations impending. Hanging together, in every sense, is better
than hanging separately."79
77. Leland, "Some Causes of Professional Unrest," 607; Fishbein, A History of
the American Medical Association, 389,1096.
78. The Pennsylvania State Medical Society's Board of Trustees' charges to its
county societies, printed in the JISMS "because of the aptness . . . of these statements," declared that physicians speaking for their county society should, "in
all discussions with lay individuals or groups or legislators, discuss only the ultimate deteriorating effects on the quality of medical service that have always
accompanied the socialization of medical practice." "To Meet the Changing
Times," JISMS 23 (1933), 475. See also Fay, "The Test of Organized Medicine,"
205-8; and Harkness, "The President Elect's Address," 272.
79. Bowen, "The Present Status of Medicine," 147; H. B. Young, "A Reorganized Medical Profession" [letter to the editor], JISMS 24 (1934), 108-9.

As Iowa physicians in county medical societies all over the
state discussed plans to care for the indigent in the early 1930s,
it is likely that the reality of "government" medicine struck
home for many of them for the first time. "Government" medicine was not a distant menace, but present down the road in
meetings of the county board of supervisors and, shortly thereafter, at the offices of county relief agents who were in charge of
dispensing state and federal aid if the county qualified. When
the county medical society doctors and local officials got on
well, with everyone understanding that extremely low fees
were only a temporary response to an emergency condition,
then hardship was almost ennobling. Linn County authorities
and physicians "are enthusiastic about the spirit of unselfishness, self-sacrifice, and willingness to abide by rules intended to
promote the greatest good for the greatest number," Dr. Downing reported to the ISMS in 1935. At the other extreme, discord
gave weight to all the rhetoric about socialized medicine. The
Pottawattamie County medical society expressed its grievances
with IERA administration in 1937. "The IERA authorities have
continued to be rather arbitrary in their promulgation of instructions," Dr. Treynor complained, "usually failing to consult
the doctor or take him into consideration before such instructions are issued." Over and over again, reports from the county
medical societies confirmed that things worked best when physicians had as much collective control as possible and worst
when lay people told them what to do. And lay people from
outside-outside the community, but especially from outside
the state-were even harder to take. "Are we to be standardized? Are New York's problems our problems?" Dr. Harkness
blustered in 1934. "Do we have to sit supinely by and have salaried employees from a foreign environment, whose very jobs
depend on the changes they can suggest, come to us, tell us just
what we should do, and should we blindly accept their decisions
as gospel truth?"*O Being instructed, not consulted, touched
doctors' pride, no matter what ended up in their pockets.
80. "Reports from Councilor Districts," JISMS 25 (1935), 377; "Reports from
Councilor Districts," JISMS 27 (1937), 343; Harkness, "The President Elect's
Address," 272.
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Physicians1 experience with indigent care was also shaped
by their patients' status as indigent, a formal classification determined by county officials, not by individual practitioners.
The label carried a stigma that brought contempt as well as
compassion. A few Iowa physicians articulated attitudes of
disdain towards those who were "improvident" rather than
"thrifty." In 1938 Dr. Harkness noted that Davenport physicians
acquiesced with the local relief plan, which did not allow indigent patients free choice of physician, because it was "in the interests of economy" that "the recipient of charity, paid for in
taxes, should be willing to forego this privilege." Dubuque
County doctors reported that they willingly accepted the burden of making private arrangements with "families who were
without funds but who still retained enough American spirit
and backbone to refuse to 'go on the county.'" Caring for their
patients' dignity enhanced their own. At the same time, this experience resonated with language that cast every tax-supported
scheme as socialized medicine, in which "universal paternalistic
care lowers [the patient's] self-pride and his standard of citizenship." With state medicine, "we approach a disguised dole, we
foster 'moral gangrene.' "$1
The problem with dignity, however, was that it kept those
who were not "on the county" from seeking medical help when
they needed it but could not pay for it. The difficulties that
people with low or moderate means had paying for acceptable
medical care, especially when it involved complex surgery, long
hospital stays, or new drugs, had surfaced as a national concern
in the 1920s. One response from physicians was simply to castigate people for not saving money properly, a tempting gambit
when national data from the late 1920s showed that the average
family spent far more per year on tobacco, candy, soft drinks,
gum, ice cream, perfume, cosmetics, and nice soap than it did
on drugs, physicians, hospitals, nurses, and dentists.82 By the
81. "Report of the Committee on Medical Economics," JISMS 23 (1933), 415;
Gordon F. Harkness, "A Doctor Contemplates the Care of the Sick," JISMS 28
(1938), 408; "Reports from Councilor Districts," JISMS 24 (1934), 359; Gordon
F. Harkness, "The Cost of Being Sick," JlSMS 23 (1933), 40.
82. Harkness, "Cost of Being Sick," 32, citing W. C. Rappley, "Comparative
Expenditures for Medical Care," J A M A 94 (1930), 1787 (no source for data).

early 1930s, however, most doctors knew full well that while
people with more than marginal incomes managed to afford the
costs of physicians' visits for minor illnesses and preventive vaccinations, it was the major illnesses and injuries, complex diagnoses, and difficult chronic conditions that had become unbearable financially even as medical help now existed to deal with
them. As a result, patients stayed away due to fear of the cost.
"The great middle class of people . . . is composed of decent,
independent, honest and honorable people," Dr. Channing
Smith of Granger reminded his colleagues in December 1933.
"These people are just as good as you and I, are just as hard
pressed as we are," he insisted, "and their problems of medical
care are our problems as well." Something had to be done, but,
Dr. Smith confessed, "I frankly do not know what the answer is
to these many problems." 83
Smith was not alone in his frustration. Ordinary physicians
had a hard enough time keeping their own businesses straight;
how could they figure out what was to be done to pay for the
diagnostic tests, drugs, and operations that medicine could provide? Physicians could m o d e their own fees based on what they
knew of their patients' circumstances, but they had no direct
control over other costs, including the bills of specialists who
had to be consulted in large towns and cities. Dr. Harkness told
his colleagues in 1933 that "lay organizers filled with Utopian
enthusiasms" had raised their poorer patients' expectations for
elaborate care. "The wealthy may pamper themselves with all
the frills if they so desire," he stated, "but the mass of people
should realize their inability to pay for them." Most people, he
continued, did not need the "diagnostic frills" that were only
available in hospitals. Two years later, when Dr. Harkness was
president of the ISMS, he was adamant that physicians had to
keep medical relief costs down in order to preserve local control
over indigent care. "If we neglect this we are inviting socialized
medicine," he warned. "There is no justification for rewarding
indigency with the frills of scientific medicine."84
83. Channing G. Smith, "What of the Future?" JISMS 23 (1933), 682 (first
printed in The Voice, the bulletin of the Black Hawk Medical Society, in 1933).
84. Harkness, "Cost of Being Sick," 40; Harkness, "The President's Interim
Report," 4.
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Making physicians largely responsible for medical costs by
ensuring that tests, drugs, and hospitalization were ordered "efficiently and not extravagantly" placed a new burden on practitioners providing indigent care through programs run by their
county medical societies. Physicians now had to be sensitive to
the drain on funds supervised by their colleagues, funds that
other physicians depended on for at least some income during
these difficult years. Many doctors may have shuddered at
Harkness's harsh language in regard to the very poor, but they
could not avoid reiterating the basic message: if you do not
make these choices, others will do it for you. State scrutiny of
medical relief costs for the indigent turned up widely varying
usage patterns, which further increased the pressure on the profession. "When a director of relief asks why in one county the
proportionate hospitalization costs are approximately nine times
(according to the case load of indigency) what they are in a nearby county," Harkness warned, "we must be prepared to show
justification for this difference." Physicians in at least some of
Iowa's county medical societies took on the task of monitoring
their colleagues' bills for indigent work. Subcommittees met each
month to vet members' charges before they were forwarded to
the board of supervisors for payment, reducing them if necessary. The occasional frank report from a county medical society
to the annual meeting of the ISMS House of Delegates demonstrated that not all members had personally taken cost containment enough to heart, forcing the society to intervene. In 1938
the president of the Ernrnet County Medical Society had to appoint a subcommittee to "see that county cases are not overhospitalized and so prevent abuse of funds provided for the hospital budget." Dr. Dewey reported that the board of supervisors
and members of the Sac County Medical Society were not getting
along as well as they had been in previous years, "due to some
overpadding of bills and some ruthless cutting of the same."85
85. Harkness, "The President's Interim Report," 4; "Reports from Councilor
Districts," JISMS 25 (1935), 371,379; "Reports from Councilor Districts," JISMS
27 (1937), 326, 334-35; "Reports from Councilor Districts," JISMS 31 (1941),
313; Meeting of the Bremer County Medical Society, 2/1/1935, in their volume
of minutes, State Historical Society of Iowa, Iowa City; "Reports from Councilor Districts," ]ISMS 29 (1939),311,314.

For many ordinary practitioners in Iowa, the 1930s brought
the first small taste of external inspection of patient billing,
apart from any workers' compensation practice they may have
had in the 1920s. Physicians active in the county medical societies with contracts for indigent care discovered that they or their
peers could review each other's indigent accounts without intolerable embarrassment or conflict. As debates raged about
ways to make health care affordable to low- and middle-income
people, especially the costs of major trauma and sickness, a
good many Iowa physicians were actually experiencing what it
was like to try to cooperate with other practitioners to manage
care for a specific population on a limited budget. At the same
time, they reacted to the perceived injustices and irritations of
localized "government" medicine. The call to resist plans for
state-run medical care by participating in "organized medicine, the medicine of their county and state medical societies,
thus drew Iowa's physicians into the fold. In 1929,77 percent of
the state's practicing physicians belonged to the Iowa State Medical Society (and hence to the AMA); in 1939 membership was
up to 91 percent; in 1946 it reached 96 percent, where it remained
through 1950. As the Depression drew to a close, organized
medicine held firm against tax-funded general medical services
and, albeit reluctantly, turned to voluntary, private, non-profit
insurance as the solution to covering the costs of health care for
Americans. A key point for organized medicine, however, was
physician control over the principles guiding acceptable medical plans and physician participation in their governance. This
ideal gave the ISMS leadership considerable pride -and a great
many headaches.

Resisting "Government"Medicine:
Voluntary Health Insurance in Iowa
The story of the emergence and expansion of what eventually
became the national Blue Cross and Blue Shield system is a
complex one. It started with plans for paying for hospital care.
In 1929 Justin Ford Kimball, an administrator at Baylor University with a background as an insurance lawyer and superintendent of schools in Dallas, devised a non-profit pre-payment plan
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for Baylor University Hospital to be offered to all the teachers in
the Dallas school system. The Baylor plan was by no means the
first hospital-centered group plan, but it is the one that later
came to be associated with the turning point between sporadic
efforts and successful long-term growth in non-profit hospital
insurance. The problems that earlier programs had had with
competition among hospitals and inadequate numbers of subscribers had convinced skeptics that voluntary hospital prepayment plans would never work, especially for small-town
and rural populations.86 Plans grew steadily in urban areas,
however, once all or most of the local hospitals joined together
under the same program and learned how to negotiate with
employer and labor groups for sigruficant contracts. Throughout the expansion of community-based, non-profit hospital insurance plans, the American Hospital Association (AHA) provided a clearinghouse for ways to manage income and costs.
The AHA'S Committee on Hospital Service also established a
set of essential principles that became formal guidelines in 1937.
If a plan passed AHA scrutiny every year, it could use a common seal of approval -the Blue Cross.87
A major sticking point surfaced repeatedly, however. Subscribers expected that coverage of hospital costs should include
physicians' services, especially those of radiologists, anesthesiologists, and pathologists, the specialists who worked full-time
within the hospitals' walls. In the mid-1930s, the AMA reluctantly accepted the emergence of hospital plans, which it carefully called "group hospitalization" rather than "health insurance," as long as those plans never included any billing or
payment of physicians' charges. The slippery slope toward socialism would be avoided "so long as the medical profession
remains in control."88 Getting separate, additional bills from
86. Robert Cunningham I11 and Robert M. Cunningham Jr., The Blues: A History of the Blue Cross and Blue Shield System (DeKalb, IL, 1997), 3-17; Bowen,
"The Present Status of Medicine," 147. A few hospitals in Iowa started contracts with county boards of supervisors in the early 1930s, negotiating a total
number of days covered for a lump sum. See, for example, "Reports from
Councilor Districts," JISMS 24 (1934), 359.
87. Cunningham and Cunningham, 7?kBlues, 17-33.
88. Christie, "The Socialization of Medicine-To What Extent Is It Desirable?"
502.

physicians for their fees for in-hospital work nevertheless angered and confused patients, who, reconfigured as "consumers"
when very large employee contracts were at stake, put considerable pressure on hospitalization insurers to provide full-service
benefits. Those putting together hospital plans in urban areas
put pressure on physicians, often through their medical societies,
to come up with some sort of pre-payment program for medical
care.
Iowa physicians reading the ISMS Journal found notices
about the experiments in hospital pre-payment schemes going
on in Texas, New Jersey, California, and elsewhere in the early
1930s alongside the more general discussions of relief work and
threats of socialized medicine.89 The Sentinel Hospital Insurance
Company started the first hospitalization plan in Iowa late in
1936. By April 1938, after changing its name to the Iowa Hospital Service Insurance Company and putting three physicians on
its board, the company had 2,500 policyholders.~The ISMS
Medical Economics Committee decided to "withdraw all semblance of approval of the company," however, when it became
a "general casualty company" later that year. At that point, the
ISMS joined with the Iowa Hospital Association to push for
legislation to exempt non-profit group hospital insurance from
some of the requirements imposed on for-profit insurance companies, notably the need to have a $25,000 cash reserve at all
times.91 Such legislation passed in 1939, and a revised hospital
insurance plan -Hospital Service, Inc. -formally started on December 1,1939, in Des Moines. With genuine non-profit status
under the new law, Iowa's Hospital Service, Inc. gained AHA
89. "Hospital Plan in Dallas, Texas," JISMS 22 (1932), 594.
90. "Hospital Insurance in Iowa," JISMS 28 (1938), 159-60. In addition to the
plans discussed in this section, some fraternal organizations in Iowa, such as
the Lutheran Mutual Aid Society, the Order of Railway Conductors, and the
Brotherhood of American Yeomen, provided medical and disability benefits.
See State of Iowa, Insurance Department, Annual Reports, 1929 and 1930, in
State of Iowa, Legislative Documents, vol. 3 (Des Moines, 1931), 202-27. How
long these groups provided some sickness benefits, in addition to death and
old age benefits, and the extent of their coverage for Iowans, requires further
research. For the still under-appreciated importance of the history of fraternal
organizations in health organizations, see James C. Riley, Sick, Not Dead: The
Health of British Workingmen during the Mortality Decline (Baltimore, 1997).
91. "Report of the Medical Economics Committee," JISMS 29 (1939),339.
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approval in 1940 and, with that, the Blue Cross seal. At the same
time, however, another non-profit hospital plan, Associated
Hospital Service, Inc., emerged in Sioux City. In the months before the two corporations agreed on a boundary between their
service territories (which basically gave the far northwest corner
of the state to the Sioux City group), Hospital Service, Inc.'s new
staff faced the anxiety of competition in what was supposed to
have been an understood non-profit monopoly.
The ISMS urged all physicians to join Hospital Service, Inc.,
using county medical societies as the basis for group enrollment.
"The support of the medical profession . . . will be of great value
in presenting the service plan to employers and employees in
the various communities as they are organized," the lournu1 editors declared in March 1940.92 As much as Hospital Service, Inc.
needed to show that physicians personally approved of the insurance, the company also needed the money. Keeping enough
coming in from premium payments to cover the costs of claimed
services was, and remained, a major challenge. Over the next
years, even as war further complicated efforts to deal with medical needs, the plan's administrators worked to find groups,
such as farmers' organizations, that would allow rural inhabitants and the self-employed to enroll, at the same time that they
sought subscribers among the regularly employed.93
At the same time that the ISMS leadership was trying to get
non-profit, voluntary hospital insurance off the ground in the
state, the society's delegates agreed that "study and experimentation with voluntary health insurance plans should be undertaken." The Medical Economics Committee proceeded to "study"
such plans off and on for the next six years. In April 1944, when
it looked as though the end of the war just might be in sight, the
ISMS House of Delegates finally resolved that a committee had
to put together a physician-run plan for Iowa within the next few
months. On November 1, the delegates met in a special session
92. "Hospital Insurance in Iowa," JISMS 30 (1940), 125; "Hospital Insurance in
Iowa," JISMS 28 (1938), 159-60; "Hospital Service Insurance," JISMS 29 (1939),
218-19.
93. "Hospital Insurance in Iowa," JISMS 30 (1940), 125; "Blue Cross Plans Approved," JISMS 37 (1947), 174. Cunningham and Cunningham, The Blues, 5787, covers the complexities of the 1940s.

to consider the proposal their colleagues had prepared. A renewed sense of urgency spurred the discussion. The threat of
legislation for national health insurance simply would not go
away, and state legislatures were starting to consider their own
compulsory plans. Thousands of "our people" would be coming home after being used to complete medical service in the
military. The costs of care for serious illness and injuries continued to burden hard-working families of modest means. Something had to be done. As important as some of the provisions of
the first plan were, moreover, the delegates' primary task was
far harder- to decide whether they, or the physicians they represented, really wanted a plan for which the ISMS itself would
be responsible.94
As ISMS president-elect Dr. Bernard told the meeting, "for
the first time the State Medical Society is going into business. It
is going into a business with which a very high percentage of
the men are unfamiliar." One of the first steps, indeed, would
be to get legislation passed that would allow physicians to incorporate in the state for business purposes. The State Insurance
Commissioner would have to approve the plan, and would pay
particular attention to whether or not it was "actuarially sound."
Premiums and costs had to stay low; to manage that the proposal centered on a service-based contract for low-income subscribers, with an indemnity plan for those above a set income.
Under the service portion, the plan would pay doctors according to a set fee bill for their services in hospitals. For those with
indemnity coverage, the plan would pay doctors the same fee
bill amount, but the doctors could then charge their patients
whatever additional fee they felt they deserved for their inhospital visits and services. Every physician who signed up to
be a future provider would have to contribute at least $25 to the
start-up reserve fund, in addition to an unspecified lump sum
that the ISMS would give from the society's savings. If income
from subscribers did not cover payments to physicians accord94. "Special Session of House of Delegates of the Iowa State Medical Society,"
JISMS 28 (1938), 497; Committee on Medical Economics, "Medical Service
Plans," JISMS 32 (1942), 133-34; "Iowa Medical Service Plan," JISMS 34 (1944),
438-39; "Transactions of the House of Delegates, Iowa State Medical Society,
Special Meeting, November 1,1944," ]ISMS 34 (1944),500.
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ing to the fee bill, moreover, doctors' compensation would be
temporarily reduced. The Blue Cross offices, luckily enough,
had agreed to take on the work of selling the policies -for a reasonable charge -since their staffs were already experienced,
and selling medical coverage fit nicely with selling hospital insurance. Physicians had to realize, however, that "the solvency
of this organization is in your hands" and that they were ultimately the ones who would "sell" the insurance to the people in
their communities.95
Not surprisingly, once the floor at the delegates' meeting
was opened to general discussion, concerns surfaced. Who, exactly, would control the new business: elected men? appointed
men? representatives from each district? specialists? Were the
delegates "being railroaded a little"? Dr. Dean Harman of Mills
County finally spoke out about the basic injustice of the proposed system: it limited coverage to physicians' fees during
hospitalization. He protested:
Our hospital facilities are from twenty to thirty-five miles away.
The adoption of this plan . . . would mean that the general practitioners in Mills County would become nothing more than glorified office boys. Must we take everybody to a hospital? Ninety per
cent of our fractures are handled at home, 95 per cent of our obstetric cases, and I will say 85 per cent of our medical cases. Given
universal distribution of this plan, along with the Blue Cross, as
soon as we make a diagnosis they will want to go to a hospital,
naturally. That ends us. What do you want us to do? To sell apples on the street corner? . . . The fee bill takes care of the surgeon
very well, but what does it do to the medical man?96

Several rural general practitioners agreed with Dr. Harman, but
argued that they trusted the ISMS physicians who had put together the plan as a starting point for non-profit, physiciancontrolled voluntary insurance in the state. As one delegate put
it after listening to the debate, "I am going to depend upon the
future to make [the plan] right with the physicians in the rural
districts." Other doctors basically admitted that they had to
95. "Transactions of the House of Delegates, Iowa State Medical Society, Special Meeting, November 1,1944," JlSMS 34 (1944), 500-504.
96. bid., 509.

trust the men who had examined the intricate details of the
medical insurance business and so knew what would work and
what would not.97
With final expressions of faith and optimism, the delegates
finally passed the principles of the plan. Governor Robert Blue
signed the enabling legislation on February 15, 1945, and the
new non-profit corporation, the Iowa Medical Service, sold its
first policies in September. By March 1946, the service's board
had dropped "the hospitalization clause . . . from surgery, obstetrics and fracture work" to "benefit the small town doctor."
At first sales went reasonably well. In July 1946 Iowa Medical
Service had 827 participating doctors-approximately one-third
of the state's licensed physicians -and 12,500 people enrolled.
Because at least half of a county's physicians had to be enrolled
as providers before policies could be sold in it, however, coverage over the state varied considerably. In counties with a dozen
physicians or less, it did not take many to prevent the plan's
expansion into certain areas, and growth soon slowed. Dr. Fred
Sternagel, who chaired the ISMS'S Committee on Medical Service, berated the state's physicians in 1948: "Ominous signs of
selfishness, suspicion and indifference among many of our members threaten to ruin the whole program-selfishness and suspicion spawned in a period of materialistic ambitions and indifference cradled by a false sense of security." Similar messages
came in the late 1940s from national leaders, who continued to
link the possible failure of voluntary insurance with the inevitability of a compulsory national health care system. "If the medical profession does not at once assume the leadership, if it does
not at once cease its double talk and double dealing with the
voluntary non-profit pre-payment plans, and throw its influence squarely and honestly behind these plans, we are going to
have compulsory government health insurance in this country
within three years," Dr. Paul Hawley, chief executive officer of
the newly organized Blue Cross-Blue Shield Commission, told
readers of the ISMS Journal in August 1948.98
97. Ibid., 511.
98. Ibid., 512; "House of Delegates Approves Medical Service Plan for Iowa,"
JISMS 34 (1944), 496-97; "Reaction of Physicians to Medical Service Plan,"
JISMS 36 (1946), 110-11; "Status of the Medical Service Plan," JISMS 35 (1945), 89;
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The Iowa Medical Service joined the national Blue Shield
group in 1946, as that organization sought to help physiciancontrolled voluntary plans (whether for profit or non-profit at
first) with information, coordination, and, eventually, ways to
transfer payments among plans as subscriber contracts increasingly crossed multiple plan areas.99 Perhaps the increasing national visibility and relative stability of Blue Shield corporations,
along with the ongoing fear of "government" medicine, encouraged more Iowa doctors to participate in the plan. In early 1947,
as well, the Iowa Medical Service became the contracting agent
for the Veterans' Administration's "Home Town Medical Care
Plan," which allowed the 340,000 Iowa veterans to see their local
physician for service-related conditions and pension authorizations instead of traveling to a VA clinic or hospital. Physicians
who wanted to participate in the program had to register with
the Iowa Medical Service.100 They did not have to belong to
the ISMS plan itself to care for veterans, but filling out the paperwork for one may have prompted doctors to send in their
forms for the other. By April 1950, 78 percent of the physicians
in practice in the state were Blue Shield providers, and the Iowa
Medical Service-at least for the moment -was comfortably in
the black. Only some 200,000 Iowans, or slightly less than 8 percent of the state's residents, were covered by the plan, however.101

"Iowa Medical Service," JISMS 36 (1946), 299; "Report of the Committee on
Medical Service and Public Relations," JISMS 38 (1948), 314-16; "Problems of
Medical Service in Iowa," JISMS 37 (1947, 511; Paul R. Hawley, "Blue Shield,
or Compulsory Government Insurance," JlSMS 38 (1948), 382; "First National
Public Relations Conference," JISMS 39 (1949), 29.
99. "Associated Medical Care Plans," JISMS 36 (1946), 255. This organization of
medical plans did not officially adopt the Blue Shield symbol until 1951, but
individual state plans had used it freely from the early 1940s. Cunningham
and Cunningham, The Blues, 51-52,72-73.
100. "Veterans Affairs Committee," [discussion of the ISMS House of Delegates meeting, 4/19/1946], JISMS 36 (1946), 320-21; "Present Status of the Veterans Administration Program in Iowa," ]ISMS 36 (1946), 405-6; Martin Olsen,
"New Medical Service Director," JISMS 37 (1947, 136; "Veterans Administration," JISMS 37 (1947, 175,180,425-26; "The Medical Service Plan," JISMS 37
(1947,298.
101. "Report of Sub-committee on Insurance," JISMS 40 (1950), 349.
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World War 11:
Military Service, the Home Front, and Postwar Iowa
As hard as some of Iowa's physicians worked to get non-profit,
voluntary hospital and medical insurance plans off the ground
between 1939 and 1947, such enterprises were certainly not
the main focus of Iowans' preoccupations during these years.
Threats of war, war itself, and postwar adjustment reshaped
many doctors' lives. World War I1 had a much deeper effect on
Iowa medicine than World War I had, largely due to the ways
the Second World War intensified already ongoing changes in
medical knowledge and practice. Not least of these changes was
the expanding involvement of the federal government in scientific research as well as health policy, the increasing status of
board-certified medical specialists, and the stepped-up emphasis
on the need to build more hospitals. The war also tested Iowa
physicians' voluntarism and sense of public duty in new ways,
as military demand for doctors drained the state of young, ablebodied male practitioners, nurses, and support staff.
Official preparation for the medical needs of a military alert
to war began in 1940, starting with the recall of medical reserve
officers to active duty in the spring.102 In June the Surgeon General asked the AMA leadership to gather data on "the medical
strength" of the country. The AMA created its Committee on
Medical Preparedness and asked every state society to appoint
a state chairman to organize local responses. Dr. Thomas Suchomel, a general practitioner in Cedar Rapids, took on this
thankless task for Iowa, and he chaired the ISMS Medical Preparedness Committee (later renamed the Procurement and Assignment Service under the War Manpower Commission) until
it formally dissolved on March 31,1946.103
Dr. Suchomel's first job was to oversee the staffing of local
draft boards with physicians who would examine recruits and
report to the board on their physical and mental health. At a national conference on medical preparedness held in Chicago in
102. "Army Experience for Physicians," JISMS 30 (1940), 169.
103. Thomas F. Suchomel, "Report of the Committee on Medical Preparedness," JISMS 31 (1941), 326-29; Thomas F. Suchomel, "Report of State Chairman of Procurement and Assignment Service," PSMS 36 (1946), 314-15.

late September, "those present" decided that "examining physicians should not be paid for their services but should make
them their patriotic contribution to the government." They
would receive "some sort of badge and certificate" from the
president of the United States to acknowledge their work, however. In addition, each county was to put together a Medical Advisory Committee, consisting of various specialists, including a
dentist and chiropodist, to assist examining physicians with consultations. (The national leaders seemed to assume that every
county actually had a slate of specialists.) Draftees passing this
stage of induction were then seen by the Army Induction Board,
where medical reserve officers and paid civilian consultants
would make the final assessment of the young men's suitability
for military service.104
When the United States entered the war on December 8,
1941, the draft went into high gear. All physicians were urged
to register immediately with the AMA's Procurement and Assignment Service. If they did not, male doctors under the age of
45 could be drafted for unclassified service and have a medical
commission considerably delayed. All physicians, including
women, the physically disabled, and those older than 45 had to
register, moreover, so that state Procurement and Assignment
Services could try to maintain an equitable distribution of doctors. Physicians declared "essential to the proper medical care
of the civilian population" would be deferred from service.
Medical students, professors, and a limited number of residents
were also placed on deferment, at least for the time being.105
Medical schools went year round, and all eligible students were
required to take military commissions, which, after a nine-month
internship, would place them in active service unless they qualified for one of the limited number of residencies deemed vital
for the war effort. The Selective Service also had a direct say in
the entry of new students into medical schools as the war continued. Despite the obvious need for new practitioners, the
number of women students at the UI medical school remained
104. "Medical Preparedness-How It Is To Work," JISMS 30 (1940),495-96.
105. "A Call to the Medical Profession," JISMS 32 (1942), 26; "National Conference on Medical Service," JISMS 32 (1942), 134-35; "Medical Preparedness,"
JISMS 32 (1942), 84-85. See also "Medical Preparedness," JISMS 31 (1941),36-37.
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at its prewar level of four to five percent.106 The relatively small
number of women (and of men ineligible for military service)
who managed to graduate between 1942 and 1945 simply could
not fill the demand for interns or community practitioners left
in the wake of war.
Throughout the war, the War Manpower Commission relied
on the medical profession to recruit its own members for military
needs, rather than resort to forced induction of doctors, although
it did establish state quotas.107 Such privileges placed considerable burdens on state chairmen after the first rush of patriotic
fervor brought out the volunteers. Iowa proudly came through
with 122 percent of its quota for 1942-unlike New York, Connecticut, and Massachusetts, which had not met even 90 percent
of their 1942 quotas by May 1943, Physicians even came out of
retirement to lend a hand. Dr. William A. Howard, for example,
"formerly retired and living near Cherokee, has located in Truro,
where he . . . will occupy the offices of Dr. Herbert N. Boden who
has entered the military service." By the s p h g of 1943, however,
Dr. Suchomel had' started to feel the pinch as voluntarism faltered. Physicians who could not meet the physical requirements
for military service, for instance, could be classified as able to be
relocated in order to release a young, willing doctor who had
been considered "essential" in his community. Suchomel openly
expressed his frustration with three doctors "who have flatly
refused to cooperate" with requests to relocate, and wished he
had the authority to force them to submit.108
106. Anderson, Internal Medicine, 79. For general assessments of the absence of
women from medical education in the 1930s to 1950s, see Regina MorantzSanchez, Sympathy and Science: Women Physicians in American Medicine (New
York, 1985); and Ellen More, Restoring the Balance: Women Physicians and the
Profession of Medicine, 1850-1995 (Cambridge, MA, 1999). Details on the specific policies and decisions affecting the admission of women and minorities to
medical schools in the twentieth century await the work of those with access
to the internal records of admissions committees.
107. Roy W. Fouts, "Procurement and Assignment of Physicians," JISMS 32
(1942),228-31. The army and navy did recruit physicians directly, which made
the AMA's system work unevenly, although it did not become as marginal in
Iowa as some accounts suggest it did at the national level. See, for example,
Anderson, Internal Medicine, 79.
108. "Procurement and Assignment Outlook," JISMS 33 (1943), 21; "Statements
Concerning Procurement of More Physicians to Meet Nation's Military and

The physicians who did stay in Iowa certainly found their
responsibilities increasing. In addition to the extra patient loads
and indigent work they shouldered, many physicians were
urged to participate in community service activities that had
started before the war and continued during these difficult years.
County medical societies trying to foster good relationships
with the State Board of Health and various lay organizations
wanted to maintain their cooperative programs, including annual drives to vaccinate infants and young children against
smallpox and diphtheria, tuberculosis screening clinics, and
health projects for 4-H groups. When fuel and food rationing
started, physicians found that they were responsible for filling
out forms to attest that the sick and vulnerable needed extra supplies. Some of the doctors who had started to specialize had to
devote more time to general practice, while those near hospitals
that had come to rely on full complements of interns and residents for night duties had to take turns staying in the hospitals
as the War Manpower Commission siphoned off interns and
residents for military work. At the annual ISMS meetings in 1943
and 1944, district councilors reported on the stresses facing the
"older doctors," who were "giving of their time and strength
almost to the breaking point." The councilors assured each
other that no one "was suffering from want of adequate medical care," yet when Des Moines County had "only 23 doctors
to look after the needs of about 50,000 persons," some of those
needs must have gone unnoticed.109
Wartime conditions at home also inspired new language
about the value of the physician's time. A 1942 editorial in the
ISMS Journal declared that medical service had already become
Civilian Needs," JISMS 33 (1943), 271; "Personal Mention," JISMS 32 (1942),
148; "Transactions of the House of Delegates [discussion period]," JlSMS 33
(1943), 337. For earlier resistance to the demands of the Committee on Medical
Preparedness, even for information about practitioners from county medical societies and individuals, see "Report of the Committee on Medical Preparedness,"
]ISMS 31 (1941), 327; and "Report from Councilor Districts," JISMS 31 (1941),
310 [Scott County].
109. See "Reports from Councilor Districts," in JISMS 31 (1941), 297-315; JISMS
33 (1943), 320-22; JISMS 34 (1944), 290-93; and JISMS 35 (1945), 271-72; "Fuel
Rationing and the Physician," JISMS 32 (1942), 517-18; "Physicians' Obligation
in Gasoline and Tire Rationing," JISMS 32 (1942), 554-55; "Invalid Diets and
Food Rationing," JISMS 33 (1943), 231.
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The pharmaceutical company Wyeth took out advertisements to advise the
public, because of the shortage of physicians caused by the war, to be conscious of saving their doctor's time, in part by going to the doctor, not
relying on the doctor to make house calls. From Journal of the Iowa
State Medical Society 35 (March 1945), xxvii.

as "sharply rationed," even if not officially, as fuel and food
were. "John Q. Public" had to refrain from calling at night, except for truly urgent conditions. People had to sacrifice "their
convenience to the convenience of the doctor instead of vice
versa," and try to see their physicians during office hours.110
Paul V. McNutt, who chaired the War Manpower Commission,
was even more adamant about making medical practice efficient.
He told the audience at the American Hospital Association War
Conference in the fall of 1942 that "everything possible must be
done to make the time of these [civilian] physicians count for
the maximum of service to patients." "Every half hour of professional service," he continued, "must now do an hour's work."
To compress an hour into 30 minutes, routine tasks had to be
delegated to nurses and assistants; hospitals had to expand outpatient clinics, so that physicians could reduce home visiting.
At the same time, hospitals and physicians themselves had
to adapt to shortages in equipment and supplies. "You have to
face the paradox of producing more and more service with
less and less equipment. You have to make old equipment do,"
McNutt stated flatly.111
Civilians, including physicians, demonstrated their patriotism by facing long hours of work and limited resources with
cheerfulness, or at least not too much overt grumbling. But a
number of Iowa physicians found their patriotic sensibilities
stretched to the limit when Congress passed an act &I March
1943 to establish the Emergency Maternity and Infant Care Program (EMIC) for the wives and infants of enlisted men in grades
four through seven of the U.S. Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and
Coast Guard. The act allocated $4.4 million for the Children's
Bureau (under the Department of Labor) to distribute in fiscal
year 1943-44 to states that accepted its provisions. Administered through states' departments of health, the program covered all wives and infants of low-ranking servicemen through
pregnancy, childbirth, six weeks of maternal postnatal care, and
110. "It Would Help . . . !" JISMS 32 (1942), 461. This was such a popular editorial that the ISMS Board of Trustees had to approve filling doctors' requests for
reprints: "Meeting of the Board of Trustees, Friday, October 2,1942," JISMS 32
(1942), 518.
111.Paul V. McNutt, "'Upgrading' of Medical Services," JISMS 32 (1942), 563.
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the first year of the child's life.112 There was to be no means test;
this was not charity. The Children's Bureau determined a nationwide fee schedule for doctors' services and hospital charges.
To participate in the service, women had to accept "ward service" for themselves and their infants, and doctors had to agree
that "supplementary payment from the family must not be accepted," even if patients were "able and willing to pay" the difference between the specified maximum fees and the doctors'
normal charges. Payments for care were sent directly to the
physician, moreover, which brought the dreaded "third party
[that is, the government] between the physician and his patient."
In April 1943 the ISMS Maternal and Child Health Committee
advised "that there was no alternative but to cooperate in the
program," as the federal government had already widely publicized it. By December, after the program had started in Iowa and
the Children's Bureau had refused to make changes that "practicing physicians" had pleaded for, the ISMS Maternal and
Child Health Committee made it clear that "continued cooperation is based solely upon patriotic grounds and a desire on the
part of the medical profession to take no action which would in
any way impede the war effort."ll3
Physicians did not have to participate in the program. "But
few physicians wish to be placed in the embarrassing position
112. [Supplemental Report from the Committee on Maternal and Child Health],"
JISMS 33 (1943), 336. The Children's Bureau had had modest funds to distribute for this purpose in 1942, for which Iowa's Department of Health had
applied, only to have the Children's Bureau reject its plan to allocate equal
amounts to all of Iowa's counties ($100 each). After negotiations with the
Children's Bureau, the funding was granted to the State Department of Child
Health to pay for obstetric and pediatric care at the UI Hospitals. See Harold E.
Farnsworth, "[Report of the] Committee on Maternal and Child Health," JISMS
33 (1943), 327; "Plan for Obstetric Care at the University Hospitals for Selected
Cases," JISMS 33 (1943),61.
113. "Emergency Maternity and Infant Care Program," ]ISMS 33 (1943),476-77;
Everett D. Plass, "The Physician's Attitude Toward the Emergency Maternity
and Infant Care (EMIC) Program," J A M A 127 (1945), 102-3; "The EMIC Program and the Children's Bureau," JISMS 34 (1944), 405; "A Further Word on
the EMIC Program," JISMS 34 (1944), 22; "Report of the Committee on Maternal and Child Health," JISMS 34 (1944),297. Given the lack of comment on the
EMIC program in the major histories about the defeat of national health plans,
it is likely that EMIC is an underappreciated source of physicians' attitudes
during the 1940s. See Gordon, Dead on Arrival, 131-32,139.

of refusing their services to the wives and infants of our countrymen," an editorial in the ISMS Journal pointed out. Embarrassed or not, Dr. Arthur D. Woods, a physician from Marshall
County, reported to the 1944 ISMS annual meeting that members of his county society had "unanimously rejected the plan.
. . . We are taking care of the women, and, if we have to, we will
do it for nothing." "This is an extremely hot baby," Dr. Lee Roy
Woodward of Mason City -and ISMS president that year-remarked as a lively discussion opened among the members of
the society's House of Delegates. Enlisted men's wives and infants needed medical care, and no one disputed the worthy
intent of the plan. And, Dr. Suchomel reminded his colleagues,
if ISMS physicians refused to participate, osteopathic physicians
would have a "golden opportunity of publicizing the fact" and
would be more than happy to take on these patients. Dr. C. P.
McHugh warned his fellow delegates that they would only
alienate soldiers and sailors. "When a fellow comes out from
some jungle in which he has been for weeks and weeks and
says, 'Some doctor wouldn't take care of my wife in Marshalltown because they would only give him $35.00,' he is going to
be mad, and every man in his company is going to be mad." In
the end, the delegates passed a resolution protesting the Children's Bureau's "regimentation" of medical care, and decided
to send two representatives to Washington, D.C., t9 register
their complaints with Iowa congressmen and to teshfy before
an upcoming House Appropriations Committee hearing.114
Dr. Everett Plass, a nationally known professor of obstetrics
and gynecology at the UI College of Medicine, and Dr. Ransom
Bernard of Clarion, a general practitioner with a specialty interest in surgery, went to Washington for the April 27 appropriations hearing. Nothing changed. Congress approved a $42.8
million appropriation to EMIC for 1944-45 and refused to consider a different payment method. "The government's position
seemed to be that it was acting in favor of the doctors, because
if the subsidy were to be paid directly to the serviceman's wife
she might spend it for something else and the physician would
not get paid at all." The Children's Bureau adamantly upheld
114. "Transactionsof the House of Delegates," ]ISMS 34 (1944), 307-11,316-18.
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its payment system, moreover, because it did not want any serviceman's wife to have "to bargain with either the hospital or
the physician over the fee she was to pay. This it was claimed
would defeat the whole purpose of the program, which is to
provide obstetric and infant care absolutely free." 115
In an essay published in the Journal of the American Medical
Association early in 1945, Dr. Plass zeroed in on what he saw as
the "fundamental issues" at stake in the EMIC program. These
were not just the problems that physicians had already raised,
which he reiterated, but encroachment of the federal government directly into providing medical care. "It cannot be denied
that sentiment for compulsory federalized health insurance is
strong among our legislators." The Wagner-Murray-Dingell bill,
first introduced in 1943, which promised a sweeping national
health system, was about to be brought before Congress again.
The EMIC, Dr. Plass and others observed, pointed to how such
a system might actually operate -its expense, the "vast amount
of clerical and bookkeeping work," and the "onerous form of
regimentation" that came with imposing a "countrywide financial standard on both physicians and patients.116
For Dr. Plass, the EMIC plan had also highlighted "the split
personality of the medical profession." Many physicians did
want to make money, sometimes at the expense of their ideals.
"The same monetary urge has made the physician oppose the
EMIC program violently in his society meetings, even while he
is accepting as many patients as come to him for care under its
provision," Dr. Plass wrote. When the Children's Bureau raised
the maximum fee for "complete obstetric care" from $35 to $50,
it knew what it was doing, Dr. Plass argued. Making "minor
financial concessions to pacify the majority of medical men"
diffused the political will of organized medicine.
115. "The EMIC Program and the Children's Bureau," JISMS 34 (1944),405-6.
116. Plass, "The Physician's Attitude Toward EMIC," 102, 104; Starr, Social
Transformation, 277-84; "Wagner-Murray-Dingell Bill," JISMS 33 (1943), 56061; "Wagner-Murray-Dingell Bill Introduced in Congress," JISMS 35 (1945),
262. Dr. Plass originally gave his paper at the Annual Conference of Secretaries
and Editors in Chicago in November 1944. The JAMA printed the discussion
that followed. See especially the comments from Dr. T h m a n Rice of Indianapolis, p. 105.

As critical as he was of EMIC, Dr. Plass recognized that simply complaining would not accomplish much. "Without offering
another plan which will resolve the admitted inequalities of the
present system of medical practice, we brand ourselves as nonprogressive reactionaries and still further lower ourselves in the
eyes of the public."117 He offered no suggestions at that point,
but opinions like Dr. Plass's undoubtedly fueled the push for
physician-controlled voluntary insurance plans under way in
Iowa and elsewhere as the war drew to a close. Certainly the
Children's Bureau's efforts to continue funding maternity and
infant medical care after the "emergency" of war had passed
faced physicians' "resentment and antagonism" at having had
their viewpoints ignored. Even the Executive Board of the American Academy of Pediatrics, long a staunch supporter of Children's Bureau's programs, had decided in 1944 to "publicly announce withdrawal" of their support for the Bureau after the
war ended, given the evidence that the Bureau planned to "directly invade the field of private practice of medicine."llg
The defeat of bills for a comprehensive national health system during the war and in the immediate postwar period rested
on a great deal more than physicians' irritation with the heavyhandedness of the Children's Bureau, of course. The reactions
of Iowa's doctors-both academic specialists such as Dr. Plass
and small-town general practitioners such as Dr. Woodsnevertheless reveal another layer of doctors' frustrdtion with
government" medicine, and so help to convey why many of
them opposed it so staunchly despite their concerns about real
inequities in American health care.
Federal involvement with medical institutions and practice
continued to expand after the war, however. Elements of the
Wagner-Murray-Dingell vision that appeared in separate bills
passed Congress between 1945 and 1950, largely because they
had the support of organized medicine. The Hill-Burton Act of
1946 (the Hospital Survey and Construction Act), for example,
I1

-

117. Plass, "The Physician's Attitude Toward EMIC," 105.
118. "The EMIC Program and the Children's Bureau," JISMS 34 (1944), 405-6;
"Next Steps Proposed for the Children's Bureau by the National Commission
on Children in Wartime," JISMS 35 (1945), 332-33; "Defeat or Modification of
S. 1318 Imperative," ]ISMS 35 (1945),439.
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provided funds for determining areas where hospitals were
most needed, and grants-in-aid to states for one-third of the
cost of constructing facilities in high-priority areas. By February
1950,31 plans for new or expanded hospitals in Iowa were under way, at a cost of nearly $19 million.119 The importance of
tax-funded investment in medical research, which had gained
new urgency at the federal level during the war, transformed
the National Institutes of Health under generous appropriations from Congress; in 1947, the NIH received $4 million for
in-house and extramural research, compared with $180,000 in
1945. Other agencies, such as the U.S. Public Health Service and
the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, also had increased budgets
for funding medical research at universities, including the University of Iowa. The GI Bill, which applied to returning military
physicians seeking additional training, along with determined
AMA efforts to orchestrate enough residencies to fill their demands, turned political thoughts to devising a federal grant program to support medical education, resulting in much-debated
bills introduced in Congress in 1949 and 1950.120
The war and the political fervor for a national health care
system also pushed practitioners towards specialization. Dr.
George Wilkinson, who received his University of Iowa M.D. in
1941, reminded his audience at the ISMS meeting in 1948 of the
military facts of life. "In the army it became evident that specialized training wag of paramount importance. Formalized residency training and board certification were the primary deciding factors which obtained the pleasant and interesting hospital
119. "Hospital Construction in Iowa," JISMS 36 (1946), 494-95; Boice, "Hospitals in Iowa," 417-19.
120. Starr, Social Transformation, 338-51; E. M. MacEwen, "Medicine and Medical Education in the Postwar Era," JISMS 35 (1945), 355-56; "Hospital Residencies for Returning Veterans," JISMS 35 (1945), 440-41; "Hospital Survey and
Construction Program," JISMS 36 (1946), 551; "Hospital Survey and Construction Program," JISMS 39 (1949), 22-23; "Federal Aid to Medical Education,"
JISMS 40 (1950), 33-34. For an example of a U.S. Atomic Energy Commission
grant to fund medical research at the UI, see "Personals," JISMS 40 (1950), 242:
"Dr. Titus C. Evans, director of the SUI radiation research laboratory, and Dr.
Paul J. Leinfelder, professor of ophthalmology, will conduct one of 34 new
research projects in biology and medicine in the Atomic Energy Commission
program. They will study the effects of x-ray and neutrons on producing lens
damage to the eye."
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R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Company took out afill-page advertisement in the
Journal of the Iowa State Medical Society to thank doctors for their
service during the war and to welcome them home. From Journal of the
Iowa State Medical Society 35 (December 1945), xix.
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assignments." After the war, he returned to do a surgical residency: "it was distasteful that I should relegate myself to the
roll [sic] of pimping for the specialist." Dr. Wilkinson noted that
he particularly feared "the limitations and restrictions which
board men, certified specialists, and medical politicians would
attempt to clamp on me" if he did not follow the prescribed
path. He ultimately decided, nevertheless, that he really wanted
a general practice, and left the residency to open an office in
Burlington. Some physicians leaving service assumed that if
"socialized medicine" came to the United States they would be
classified as they had been in the military, with salaries linked
to specialty experience and certification, "and many of them resolved to secure these advantages when they returned home."l21
The attraction of specialty practice for veterans and new
graduates sparked concern over the probable demise of the general practitioner, which joined the dismay of earlier decades over
the apparent passing of the rural doctor. In 1949 Dr. Michael
Carey, a middle-aged general practitioner in Council Bluffs,
wrote bluntly that "today, to be a general practitioner seems to
carry a stigma of inferiority." He urged his colleagues to support efforts to heighten professional respect for their work because, he asserted, patients preferred general practitioners, who
were "willing to listen to their ailments . . . and treat their bodies
as a whole, not piecemeal," rather than "be bandied about from
one specialist to another." For Dr. Carey, specialists threatened
not only "the intimate doctor-patient relationship, so necessary
to private practice," but also general practitioners' autonomy.
Ever increasing restrictions on what the general practitioner
could do in the hospital-being told one day, for example, that
"such-and-such procedures may be done only by a certified
specialist" after having done them for years-pointed to a future that Dr. Carey did not welcome. The "rules and regulations
fostered and inspired by apparently well-meaning [national]
board members" heralded the way that the medical profession
itself was moving toward setting national standards for practice
121. George W. Wilkinson, "Why I Chose General Practice," ]ISMS 38 (1948),
285-87; William A. O'Brien, "Recent Developments in Hospital Organization
and Medical Practice that May Affect the Future," ]ISMS 36 (1946), 279.

in the postwar decades.122 The diverging paths of generalists
and specialists, heightened by the expanding role that medical
research had within medical schools and university hospitals,
came into focus in these postwar years, and they would reshape
the meaning of "physician control" for the rest of the century.

Conclusion
"Physician control," the mantra so regularly voiced during
meetings of the Iowa State Medical Society and published in the
Journal's editorials and articles, spurred the expansion of organized medicine between 1929 and 1950. It provided a common
ground for resistance to outside groups -especially government agencies -that hoped to control private, fee-for-sewice
medical practice or, more radically, to replace it with some
other system that could bring affordable health care to all
Americans. As much as some Iowa physicians may have disliked the American Medical Association, when it came to dealing with perceived threats to their professional autonomy, the
county medical society became the local unit for professional
solidarity, and the state medical society the place to work for
political goals.
The experiences and reactions of Iowa physicians in the
1930s thus highlight not only the increasing pressures on them
to find some solutions for the burdens of high medical costs, but
also the complexities of their responses to those demands when
faced with the changes that pre-payment plans might make to
the way they practiced medicine. As important as considerations of income clearly were for AMA leaders and rural physicians alike, Iowa physicians at all levels saw state and federal
involvement in payment programs as threatening several profoundly held values that meant as much as-or more thanmoney. A decade of experience with trying to care for indigent
patients during the Depression deeply undermined the physician's traditional methods of managing poverty: the sliding
scale, personal charity, and a firm belief that the poor should
have free choice of physician, who would then provide the best
122. Michael J. Carey, "The General Practitioner in This Era of Specialization,"
PSMS 39 (1949), 110,111.
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medical treatment without regard for remuneration. As unpleasant as the individual physician's paternalism may have
been for patients unable to pay, or as deficient as that care may
actually have been for those stigmatized by pauperism, practitioners took considerable pride in their idealistic values in the
midst of their own economic distress. As long as physicians felt
that their generosity was largely voluntary and appreciated,
then they could be proud of it. When it was expected and imposed by lay people, whether businessmen or social workers,
they felt undermined, exploited, and dependent on others' estimation of the value of their work.
During the 1930s Iowa physicians of all sorts gained direct
experience with "government" medicine when managing care
for the indigent and poor in their counties. Where county medical societies negotiated with boards of supervisors for care of
the indigent, moreover, Iowa physicians had to balance their
individual autonomy with the collective good of the physicians
who shared that duty. However much physicians may have
talked about collective interests and proclaimed professional
ideals in their meetings, the abstract became quite concrete at
that point. The work had to be done and fair bills submitted,
sometimes even reviewed by their own colleagues. The county
supervisors and relief agents in charge of state and federal allocations scrutinized hospital costs and physicians' charges as
well, and brought dxternal monitoring of medical costs to a new
bureaucratic level.
In the 1940s the Emergency Maternity and Infant Care program provided another experience of "government" medicine.
The purpose was admirable, for doctors had long advocated the
importance of prenatal and infant care for reducing maternal
and infant morbidity and mortality. In its execution, however,
physicians felt manipulated into accepting a nationally standardized program in which their points of view were trivialized
and ignored. That experience made even the most patriotic of
Iowa doctors bitter.
Physicians' reluctant turn toward voluntary, non-profit hospital and medical insurance in Iowa was born of political necessity. The Iowa Hospital Association (Blue Cross) and Iowa Medical Service (Blue Shield) plans were "physician controlled" in

the sense that leaders of the ISMS appointed physicians to the
boards of these non-profit corporations, and those physicians
had some influence on the plans' scope and principles. Professional managers and insurance experts also had a great deal of
weight in how these businesses operated, however. In 1948-49,
when hospital costs under Blue Cross in Iowa had risen faster
than its managers expected, analysis pointed to "possible abuse"
in admission for diagnostic purposes and in the ordering of expensive laboratory services, drugs, oxygen, and physical therapy.
"It is felt that the physician must have the moral fortitude to tell
his patient he is not entitled to diagnostic services under his contract," an editorial in the ISMS Journal told its readers. And, it
went on, doctors simply had to keep costs down or voluntary
insurance plans - their plans -would fail.123
In the midst of confusion and frustration over professional
issues, physicians did have a major solace in the late 1940s. What
they could do for their patients expanded every year. Antibiotics
cured people rapidly sinking towards death. Prompt whole
blood transfusions enabled others to survive trauma and operations that would have been nearly impossible before. Soon, other
new drugs and techniques were announced so frequently that
rapid change itself became the new status quo. As federal funds
began to flow to Iowa for advanced laboratory and clinical investigations, moreover, Iowa-based physicians and scientists began to make their marks in national and international Circles for
their research results. Over the next 50 years, heartfelt celebrations of biomedicine's efficacy and triumphs regularly appeared
alongside continuing criticisms of the profession's inability to figure out how to bring affordable, high-quality, empathetic health
care to all people. Iowans, like many Americans, had learned to
want it all.

123. "High Utilization Experience of Blue Cross," JISMS 39 (1949)' 399.

